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I. INTRODUCTION
The Cold War has ended and the North-South conflict that marred imernational
relations at the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s has retreated from the international
diplomatic spotlight. World economic activity is shifting toward trade in inteIlectual
property-based goods and services. Although nearly all of the world's states are
participating in this infonnation transformation both directly and indirectly, deviations
from a universal norm are nevertheless present as a result of variations in wealth,
economic structure, governmental organization, and cultural practices.
All facets of modem society have come to depend heavily on technology. This
phenomenon of rapid technological expansion can be attributed to the versatility and
widespread applicability of certain technologies. A technological discovery in the
electronics industry may reverberate across several different sectors of the economy,
resulting in related advancements in several industries. A new computer chip may
decrease the time necessary to disseminate massive amounts of information, thereby
increasing scientific, economic, and possibly even military efficiency in a short period of
time. As a result, the nation that possesses the greatest capacity for technological
development necessarily wields a tremendous degree of power. A single technological
advancement can significantly bolster a particular nation's power relative to other
nations.
Increasingly, technology represems a crucial variable in the formulation of
national security since it can directly influence state power. Traditionally, factors that
affect military power have been a central concern of foreign policy practitioners.
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Technological creations, even if not developed specifically with the military in mind, can
affect military power both directly and indirectly. Technological innovation can result in
more sophisticated weaponry, but it can also lead to a strengthened economy which
indirectly improves a particular nation's ability to mobilize for war. Moreover, a strong
economy results in greater leverage in trade negotiations. Technological gains are
fungible. In other words, technological advances tend to increase levels of power in
several different sectors of a panicular society, thereby increasing the degree of power
enjoyed by a panicular nation. It necessarily follows that policy practirioners of one state
will tend to view relati ve technological gains in another state as a potential threat to both
economic and military vitality.
Several scholars have studied the effects of relative technological gains in a
military context; however, few have focused on relative gains in technology and the
repercussions for international economic security.1 Given the importance of economic
strength to a wide variety of national security concerns, it seems unusual that more
scholars have not undertaken a comprehensive study of relative economic gains as they
relate to foreign policy. In the article, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response
to Japanese Industrial Policy," Michael Mastanduno analyzes the ways in which United
States foreign policy is influenced by relative economic gains in relation to Japan. In his
analysis, Mastanduno interprets three cases of trade disputes between the United States
and Japan-aircraft, satellites, and high definition TV (HDTV) in the context of
international relations theory. At the end of his aniele, Mastanduno comes to the
conclusion that relative economic gains do indeed matter, but that resultant policies are
not always determined solely by relative considerations. The focus of M,astanduno's
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article is narrow and the results are mixed. Nevenheless, Mastanduno is one of the few
scholars that have attempted to interpret U.S. foreign economic policy in the context of
relative-gains theory.

In this paper, I intend to expand upon Mastanduno's ground-breaking inquiry by
analyzing the motivating factors behind the behavior of the United States in its attempt to
establish and maintain an international intellectual property rights regime. The
international intellectual property rights system, established at the 1994 Uruguay Round
of GATT, represents an international agreement with unprecedented reach into domestic
state affairs. This ambitious attempt at establishing a high international nonn of
intellectual propeny protection was created as a result of inflexible American resolve. I
will attempt to identify the initial impetus that helped define U.S. action-was it relative
gains considerations more in line with a realist conception of international relations, or
can U.S. behavior be explained more readily by a neoliberal construction? In otherwords,
did the United States work to create TRIPS solely to promote U.S. interests, or did the
United States create TRIPS in order to create a universal nonn of copyright protection
that would benefit all those involved? In addition, what sort of challenges to both U.S.
foreign policy and the international economic order result from the rapid proliferation of
technology?
In my attempt to answer the aforementioned questions, I will draw from the
writings of such realists as Joseph M. Grieco, Michael Mastanduno, and Stephen Krasner
and such liberals as Kenneth Oye, John Gerard Ruggie, Arthur Stein, Robert O. Keohane,
and Lisa L. Martin. According to realists, nation-states are sensitive to changes in relative
power. Nations exist in an anarchical environment that breeds fear and mutual distrust.
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States are susceptible to exploitation by other states when changes in relati ve power
occur. A particular state my lose some power relative to another, or another state may
gain more power, thereby producing a condition of power imbalance. Cooperation in
such an environment is not impossible; however, states constantly worry that their
present allies may grow so strong that they become disproportionately powerful
adversaries in the future. According to proponents of neoliberalism, which recognizes
the same "cooperation dilemma" as realists, collecti ve action is possible as long as the
pOtential for defection is minimized. 2 Neoliberalism also contends that collaboration can
be achieved through the creation of a binding international agreement associated with an
institution that can monitor and enforce the agreement. 3 A corollary of liberal theory is
found in the writings of John Gerard Ruggie. Ruggie's model, known as "embedded
liberalism," altempts to address the fears associated with perceived threats to sovereignty
confronting states when deciding whether or not to participate in an international
institution. The central assumption of embedded liberalism is that nations enjoy wide
latirude to intervene in domestic economies in order to alleviate dislocations resulting
from trade liberalization. 4 Another corollary of liberal theory that embraces many
fundamental components of realism is post-hegemonic stability theory. Robert Keohane
developed post-hegemonic stability theory during the early 1980s, and it attempts to
explain state behavior in an anarchic environment dominated by a declining hegemonic
state. Post-hegemonic stability theory predicts that cooperation is more likely in an
anarchic international environment than realists are willing to concede.
In this paper I argue that the United States' efforts to establish an intemational
IPR regime based on the American system is best explained by a synthesis of realism and
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post-hegemonic stability theory. Post-hegemonic stability theory accords with realism's
recognition of relative-gains concerns, and it helps

to

describe the formation of American

perceptions in a post-Cold War context. The case of Brazil set an important precedent in
the development of U.S. IPR policy in that U.S. action vis a vis Brazil succeeded in both
refooning Brazil's domestic system as well as simultaneously inducing other developing
nations to become signatories to TRIPS. Brazil is generally viewed as a U.S. foreign
policy success, so the policy approach used to reform the Brazilian IPR system
necessarily invites comparison with other cases. China represents one of the most
difficult contemporary cases facing U.S. IPR policy-makers. The case of China
highlights many of the challenges-facing effective intellectual property enforcement that
result from unchecked globalization. The noticeable decrease in state sovereignty and
conlfOl associated with globalization poses significant problems for traditional
international relations theory. I argue that a new approach is required to achieve
constructi ve reform to a higher standard of intellectual property protection.

II. BACKGROUND
A Shift In U.S. Policy
During the 1980s, United States IPR (intellectual property right) policy
transformed from an unorganized to a coordinated policy of forcing change in trading
partners whose levels of intellectual property protection were deemed inadequate. The
1980s witnessed a redefinition by Americans of what constituted acceptable intellectual
property protection. One of the reasons for this policy shift can be anributed to changes
in the world political economy. Although intellectual property abuses had been occurring
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for decades. by the mid-1980s, lax global IPR's were conceived of as a threat to
American economic fortitude. Changes in severa] economic indicators combined to draw
attention to America's declining economic strength relative to the rest of the world. Slow
growth rates, an overvalued dollar, balance of payment problems, and new international
trade patterns were cause for concern among American trade policy practitioners. The
ability of the United States to compete in an increasingly global economy led many to
question the liberal economic principles on which U.S. trade policy was based.
Asymmetrical trade policies and protected foreign markets were viewed as threats to the
open American market. In effect, the 1980s gave rise to a protectionist backlash in the
United States. The belief that trade liberalization should only be offered in a reciprocal
manner came to provide the foundation for much of United States trade policy
including that regarding intellectual property.s
This change in United States IPR policy also coincided with the cessation of the
Cold War. One of the consequences of fighting a long, drawn-out cold war of attrition
was the gradual depletion of American economic vitality. During the Cold War, the
United States consistently subjugated economic interests in favor of strategic politico
military concerns. From the Marshall Plan to help rebuild Europe to a policy of reverse
discrimination in order to help promote Japanese economic growth, for almost half a
century American economic hegemony gradually declined relative to other nations.
American economic strength in absolute terms increased gradually over the second half
of the 20th Century; however, because the U.S. provided a security umbrella for many
nations during the Cold War. these nations were able to focus most of their resources and
energy on economic growth. By rhe mid-1980s, the relative decline of U.S. economic
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strength had become apparent. By the end of the Cold War a few years later. the United
States found itself without any major strategic military threats. As a result, the end of the
Cold War marked the ascendance of American economic interests to a position of
importance among United States foreign policy concerns. One of the more obvious
indicators of tltis trend is the maturation of United States intellectual property rights
policy following the Cold War.
By the mid-1980s, trade in high technology goods had become an important
sector of the American economy. Amidst growing fears of diminishing American
competitiveness, the U.S. found itself slipping in some key high-technology sectors. 6

Lax intellectual property rights protection abroad was identified as a key factor in
America's economic decline. American high-tech firms played an instrumental role in
elevating the importance of U.S. IPR policy. In fact, representatives from key industry
sectors-pharmaceuticals. fine chemicals, computer software, film and music recordings.
were directly responsible for shaping USTR (United States Trade Representative) IPR
policy. These industry groups banded together to form two very powerful lobby groups:
the Intellectual Property Committee and the International Intellectual Property Alliance.
These two interest groups boast large full-time staffs with extensive resources at their
disposal. The lack of resources available to the USTR for conducting research on the
effects of lax intellectual property protection has greatly enhanced the persuasion
exercised by high-tech industry groups in influencing trade policy.? The world economic
climate of the late 19805 proved fortuitous for well-organized high-tech sectors of
American industry that were able to speak with a collective voice.

u.s. policymakers

came under increasing pressure from American industry to do something about
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America's competitive decline; high tech industry represented a rapidly expanding sector
where American firms enjoyed a strong comparative advantage in international markeLS.
A general lack of effective IPR protection encouraged copyright infringement and piracy
by foreign companies. thereby undermining America's high-tech comparative advantage.
The call for action by high tech sectors of the U.S. economy did not go unheeded
for long. The Reagan administration developed a multi-track approach to U.S. IPR
policy. The U.S engaged countries in bilateral agreements, and it did not shy away from
threatening unilateral sanctions. This policy marked a shift away from the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WlPO) which was viewed as an inadequate vehicle
for securing u.s. interests. WIPO maintained a single-issue focus and tended to grant
greater weight to developing country concerns. At the behest of American industry
groups, the USTR introduced the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement at the Uruguay Round negotiations of GAIT. 8 Under this agreement. the
U.S. sought to harmonize WTO member nations' intellectual property systems according
to a relatively high universal standard beneficial to U.S. firms.
Along with a multilateral approach to achieving a more uniform international
system of IPR protection, several other measures were created to help strengthen the
mandate of the USTR. In 1988, Section 301 of the Trade and Competitiveness Act was
amended to require the USTR to investigate countries that have a history of violating
existing laws and agreemenLS dealing with intellectual property rightS.,,9 Nations who
are discovered to be in violation of a minimum standard of intellectual property
protection are placed on a "watch list" which results in the opening of bilateral talks. The
countries with the most egregious abuses are designated priority countries. Priority
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nations can be subjected to unilateral sanctions should bilateral discussions fail to induce
positive change. Many countries have changed their practices simply to avoid being
placed on the watch list. In addition

to

the Special 301 Provision. the USTR will often

choose to link intellectual property issues with the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) and other benefits granted to developing nations including the funding of joint
scientific projects and International Development Bank loans. Despite all of the tools at
the disposal of US foreign policy practitioners, some nations continue to violate
intellectual property norms and agreements. Brazil was one of the first nations to initially
refuse to acquiesce to U.S. IPR standards. Stubborn behavior from nations such as Brazil
prompted the United States to step up its drive to establish a stringent multilateral lPR
regime that would further legitimize the United States' position. lo The resultant
agreement, TRIPS, was signed in 1994.

The Paris Convention
TRIPS expanded upon several pre-existing international intellectual property
agreements. Both the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works pre-dated TRIPS by
nearly 110 years. Both conventions represent two of the most comprehensive
predecessors to the TRJPS Agreement.
Industrialized nations made up the vast majority of original signatories to the
Paris Convention (signed in 1883). The only developing nations to sign the convention
were Brazil (1884), the Dominican Republic (1890), Mexico (1903), and Cuba (1904).
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After 1962,62 more developing countries joined the Paris Union, During the 19905.
membership grew once again so that by 1997, 132 countries had signed the convention. I I
The Paris Convention has been amended periodically during the course of the
twentieth century, most recently in 1979. Unlike TRIPS, the Paris Convention does not
impose minimum standards of copyright protection among member states; however, the
convention does require signatories to adhere to the principle of "national treatment," In
other words. parity must exist between the rights enjoyed by both citizens and foreigners.
Despite the presence of the national treatment provision within the convention, the
inconsistent application of diverse standards between states creates a difficult
environment in which to conduct business, A patent application that is filed in one
member country does not automatically receive protection in all member countries;
consistency must be maintained in relation to national levels of protection but standards
may vary from one state to the next.
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As a result, applications for protection must be

made to the governments of all nations in which an individual wishes to sell his or her
product-a process requiring a great deal of time and effort. 13 For example, a patent
holder in the United States does not receive any protection for a patented good in any
market but the United States. If the patent-holder wishes to sell the patented product
abroad. the patent-holder must apply for protection in each and every market that he or
she wishes to sell the product. Furthermore. even if the patent-holder is granted
protection in every market. there is no guarantee that the same level of protection will be
granted in every market because there is not minimum standard of protection. The most
controversial provision of the Paris Convention is Article V, This article grants states the
right to issue compulsory licenses. A compulsory license law allows a government to
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prohibit the foreign owner of a protected good from making and distributing the product
and from selecting a local maker and distributor licensee. Under this provision, a
government can grant exclusive distribution rights to a domestic company, thereby
hindering the foreign owner's ability to exercise discretion in deciding how his or her
good or service is sold and marketed. 14 For example, a phannaeeutical company that
wishes to distribute its products through a subsidiary in a foreign market, may be
prohibited from doing so under Miele V. The foreign government may exercise the
right to choose a domestic distributor, regardless of whether that distributor can provide
the highest level of service. Despite periodic revisions and amendments over the course
of a century, by the 1980s, the Paris Convention failed to meet the expectations of U.S.
foreign policy practitioners. Several loopholes within the convention invited exploitation
by intellectual property pirates and corrupt governments the world over.

The Berne Convention
While the Paris Convention bears a direct relationship to a discussion of
pharmaceutical patents, the main provisions of the Berne Convention (signed in 1886)
have helped define the level of protection granted computer software. Like the Paris
Convention, the Berne Convention stipulates that when the author of a particular work is
not a citizen of the country in which he or she is seeking protection, that the author "shall
enjoy in that country the same rights as national authors." This right is limited by the
caveat stating that the level of protection offered to the author must be commensurate
with the laws of the country where protection is claimed. IS Another important article of
the convention is Article 9, stating that the author has an "inalienable right to an interest"
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in reproduction and resale of the work. The rights of authors are further limited by
Article 13, stipulating that national governments may determine the conditions under
which the rights are exercised. Article 17 also recognizes sweeping governmental
authority: "The provisions of this Convention cannot in any way affect the right of the
Government of each country of the Union to permit, to control, or to prohibit, by
legislation or regulation, the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or
production in regard to which the competent authority may find it necessary to exercise
that right." Finally, unlike the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention establishes
certain minimum standards relating to literary and anistic works. A total of 114
governments, including Brazil, China, Egypt, and India, are all signatories to the Berne
Convention. 16 The United Nations-affiliated World Intellectual Property Organization
(WlPO), which boasts a controlling majority of developing country members, is
responsible for the administration of the Berne Union.
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Since 1994, the main issue facing the USTR regarding IPR protection. is
enforcement of existing standards. According to Susan Sell, a leading scholar on
international intellectual property rights, abuses continue in spite of new laws and
regulations.
In nearly every instance the targeted countries have engaged in foot dragging and
chosen not to implement and enforce new policies. The continued monitoring and
repeated threats of renewed Section 301 action in the absence of satisfactory enforcement
of the new policies suggest that the trend toward greater protection of intellectual
property is not being as ardently embraced as the United States would wish. The targeted
states acquiesce on paper and do just enough to free themselves of U.S. pressure-but no
more. While these countries have changed their policies, they have not changed their
minds about the merits of intellectual property protection ... Free riding on others'
intellectual pro~rty and the profits of piracy still outweigh the liberal norm of respect for
property rights. 18
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China stands out as the quintessential contemporary example of how sigriacories to the
TRIPS agreement and other bilateral agreements can agree to institute new standards yet
fail to enforce them.
Despite a robust American economy, the United States continues CO push for
stronger IPR protection abroad. Allhough poor economic perfonnance may have initially
contributed to the attention given IPR protection by U.S. policy makers, continued action
by the United Srates is by no means predicated on poor economic conditions. Further
economic success will depend on institutions that serve to promote U.S. concerns abroad.
Therefore, the United States maintains a significant interest in securing the comparative
advantage thal American finns currently enjoy in knowledge-intensi ve goods and
services.

RESEARCH DESIGN
I will employ the comparative case method in addressing the following three
questions. Firstly, what are the motivating factors behind the behavior of the United
States in its attempt to establish and maintain an international intellectual property rights
regime. Secondly, what theory(ies) best ex-plaines) U.S. action; more specifically. did the
U.S. create TRIPS as a result of relative-gains considerations, consistent with a realist
explanation of international relations. or does neoliberalism provide a better explanation?
Finally, what challenges to both U.S. foreign policy and the international economic order
result from the rapid proliferation of technology? To the two cases I will apply a
theoretical framework consisting of both realist and neoliberallliberal thought. After
reviewing {he relevant historical facts of each case. the respective theoretical lenses will
enable me to interpret each case in a disciplined manner. At issue is the behavior of a
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particular nation-a nation that currently occupies a central, controlling position on the
world stage. In order to explain why a particular nation acts in a certain manner, it is
necessary to recognize the limitations that necessarily constrain that nation's actions. For
this reason, the environment in which a particular nation acts will both limit and enable
state behavior. The environment is likely to influence the action, and the action will in
tum produce an effect on the environment.
In evaluating the behavior of the United States and its efforts to establish an
international intellectual property rights regime in its image. I will look at the motivating
factors behind United States action. Once the "why" is established, the next step is an
evaluation of the "how"-were the selected means successful? If not, what are the
alternatives? What restrictions limit the policy options? The limjtations on state
behavior are directly related to the international environment, therefore, the "how" leads
to a broader question of how the international environment both enables and constrains
American foreign intellectual propeI1Y rights policy.
The first case that I have chosen is that of the Brazilian phannaceutical industry.
Brazil is generally viewed as a U.S. foreign policy success. Initially, Brazil refused to
adopt new standards of intellectual property rights protection; however, under U.S.
pressure Brazil finally passed new legislation that effectively refOlmed its domestic IPR
legal system to meet high American standards. Since the introduction of new regulations,
foreign investment in Brazil has increased markedly.
The second case is that of China and computer software piracy. Like Brazil,
China is a nationalistic country with a robust developing market that holds enormous
potential for future expansion. Similar to Brazil, China has refused to ensure that
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intellectual property right norms are upheld within its sovereign borders. Unlike Brazil,
China continues to hold the dubious distinction of being a "rogue" state that has
repeatedly failed to enforce existing intellectual property rights despite consistent U.S.
pressure. Given the facial similarities between Brazil and China, can the success of
Brazil be duplicated with China? How is the China dilemma different? Does China
require a different policy approach altogether? The future role of the TRlPS regime most
likely hinges on the final outcome of US. efforts to bring China more in line with
international IPR norms.
Both Brazil and China represent two very important markets for American high
tech goods and services. The United States currently holds the upper hand in trade
relations toward both nations. but how long will .American preeminence last? US.
policy-makers can threaten to restrict access to a large U.S. market, but developing
markets are growing at a much faster annual rate. 19 In order to cement an advantageous
position for American high-tech industry in foreign markets, the United States must
secure protection for US. products abroad. High tech industry represents the future of
the world economy. In an international realm where strategic military threats are no
longer dominant, the nation with the largest capacity for technological development can
exercise considerable control over international economic affairs. Increasingly,
economic security has come to stand for national security.
This paper is divided into three major sections consisting of five chapters. The
first section after the introduction is the theoretical introduction and analysis. This
section introduces the relevant theoretical models that will be used to analyze the two
cases. The second section consists of the two case studies. Each case will be evaluated
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using two competing international relations theories: realism and
neoliberalism/liberalism. The third section consists of the conclusion and future policy
recommendations based on those conclusions.

III. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. IPR POLICY
In searching for an explanation as to why the United States viewed the creation of
an international intellectual property rights regime as serving iLS interests, it is necessary
to provide a theoretical framework to interpret the related course of events. An evaluation
of the TRIPs regime is informed by two competing schools of thought in international
relations theory: neoliberalism and realism. One of the major points of contention
between the two theories is the potential for international cooperation between nations.
Given the cooperative nature of the TRIPs regime, this argument has special relevance.
Neoliberalism is most often associated. with the notion that states act in order to increase
indi vidual gains without paying attention to the gains of other states-in other words, the
pursuit of absolute gains governs international relations. Realism, on the other hand,
contends that states act according to perceived disparities in relati ve gains. Both theories
attempt to define state behavior in an anarchical international environment, however,
both theories differ as to the appropriate definition of anarchy. Realism and
neoliberalism also have different explanations regarding interaction between different
categories of states. For example, neoliberals argue that states possessing similar
governmental, economic, and social structures behave in a predictable fashion; however,
realists argue that all states, regardless of political, economic. and social structure, behave
the same way. Conflict within the TRIPS regime oftentimes occurs along categorical
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groupings of nation-states. A final aspect of the neoliberal-realist debate that lends itself
well to a discussion of the TRIPs regime, is the argument over the effect of linkage issues
on international cooperation. The fungibility of intellectual property makes it a natural
candidate for linkage with other issue areas. Before delving into an analysis of the
United States' behavior in formulating international intellectual property policy, a
fundamental discussion of the two theoretical models is in order.
In this chapter, I begin by surveying the central tenets of both neoliberalism and
realism. Fundamentally, both theories start from a similar core assumption of interstate
anarchy. however, both theories

am ve at entirely different predictions for international

cooperation. Once the two theories have been introduced, I compare the effectiveness of
realism and its recognition of relative-gains with neoliberatism, which posits that states
are only concerned with absolute gains. The relative vs. absolute gains debate helps to
enlighten the subsequent analysis of the fonnation of TRIPS. After exposing the
inadequacies of neoliberalism in relation to TRIPS, I introduce two other strains of
thought that are closely associated with neoliberalism: embedded liberalism/social
constructivism and hegemonic stability theory/post-hegemonic stability theory.
Embedded liberalism attempts to build upon the failure of neoliberalism in accounting for
the problems that state sovereignty poses for cooperation; however, embedded liberalism
is unsuccessful in providing a sound predictive model for state behavior. Post-hegemonic
stability theory is unique in that it manages to seamlessly integrate a recognition of
relative-gains with a decidedly liberal prediction for cooperative ventures. Post
hegemonic stability theory helps to jnfonn an analysis of U.S. perceptions contributing to
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the formation of TRIPS at the end of the Cold War through a recognition of relative
economic decline.

REALISM
According to the realist approach to international relations, nations are sensitive to
changes in relative power. 20 Nation-states exist in an anarchical environment, thereby
creating a pervasive condition of fear and distrust. Anarchy is defined by realists as an
ordering principle recognizing independent, sovereign states as the primary actors in the
international arena; there is no higher authority above the nation-state. 21 With the ever
present possibility of war looming in the background, relations between nations are
defined by constant security competition. The intensity of this competition varies from
case to case. n At the extreme, nations worry that they will be either conquered or
destroyed by more powerful states. [0 a more moderate sense, nations are fearful that a
decrease in their power, or an increase in another state's power relative to their own, will
enable other countries to take advantage of their weakened political position. A
particular nation will take action to remedy changes in the distribution of power that
serve to disadvantage the capabilities of that nation. 23
Several other assumptions flow from the realist conception of anarchic
international relations. Since states possess offensive military capability, every state
inherently possesses the ability to harm and potentially destroy one another.

24

A third

assumption that follows from the aforementioned condition is that states can never be
certain of the intentions of Other states. 25 In a world of imperfect infonnation, state
behavior is impossible to predict beyond a shadow of a doubt. Moreover. once benign
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intentions may become malignant in a very short period of time. Ultimately, slates are
concerned with survival in an uncertain, constantly changing environment. Calculated
survival strategies enable states to generally act in a rational manner; however,
misperceived intentions can result in irrational actions, thereby exacerbating the
pervasive condition of fear and distrust in international relations. 26
Since states cannOl rely upon one another for security, alliances may form, but
they only represent temporary arrangements. The international arena is ordered in such a
way that states acting in their own self-interest stand to benefit the most. States that can
successfully improve their military and economic strength relative to other states will
enjoy a higher degree of security.- In essence, states possess the potential to act both
offensively as well defensively?7
According to realists, cooperation can and does occur despite numerous
disincentives for collective arrangements. In order to succeed, cooperative endeavors
must adequately address both relative-gains considerations and concerns about cheating.
Realists contend that states are concerned with both absolute gains and relative gains. 28
Due to balance of power considerations, states are primarily motivated by relative gains.
In an anarchic international environment, states are concerned with at least maintaining
the status quo relative to another state when entering into an agreement. A related
concern of states is that one or more states will defect from a cooperative arrangement,
thereby gaining a relative advantage. This phenomenon is known as "cheating" in
international relations parlance. To realists, institutions represent manifestations of
national self-interest based on the international distribution of power. The most powerful
states create institutions to promote national concerns. Cooperation and institution
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building are possible in a realist world, but only if they coincide with indi vidual stale
interests. 29

NEOLIBERALISM
Neoliberal theory poses a significant challenge to realism in that it seeks to build
upon a fundamental premise of realism to achieve an entirely different explanation for
state interaction in the international realm. Like realism, neoliberalism takes power into
consideration. but not to the exclusion of domestic and ideological variables. Similarly,
neoliberal theory, like realism, can be characterized as utilitarian and rationalistic. 3o Like
realists, neoliberals argue that states are the main actors in world politics and that
international anarchy impedes cooperation. Since cheating is both feasible and
profitable, collaboration in an anarchic realm is difficult. Unlike realists, neoliberals
posit that international institutions can promote cooperation through eliminating
incentives to cheat. 31 Realism and neoliberalism are very similar in several respects;
however, the two schools of thought differ subtly on three counts: the decision-making
apparatus of states in an anarchic environment, relative vs. absolute gains, and the
potential for international cooperation.
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a useful tool in analyzing the potential for state
cooperation in an anarchic international environment. According to realists, the outcome
of the Prisoner's Dilemma provides a perfect example of why the potential for
cooperation is minimal at best. 32 Neoliberals point to different variations of the
Prisoner's Dilemma as examples of how cooperation can spring from the "institutionally
arid setting" of international relations. 33 Neoliberals find fault with the traditional, realist
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conception of the Prisoner's Dilemma because it assumes that states are unitary actors.
According to neoliberalism this assumption is inaccurate because it fails to consider the
following: government decisions that are the product of politically mediated coalition
bargaining; the cognitive and perceptual elements of state interaction; the give and take
of bargaining; and the search for joint gains. 34 Neoliberalism contends that through an
iterated Prisoner's Dilemma defections can be punished and coordinated conventions can
develop.35 More specifically, an effort to respond to present cooperation with
cooperation in the future and a threat to meet present defection with future defection can
effectively improve the potential for cooperation. 36 In order to achieve this objective of
increased cooperation, actors' moves must be relatively transparent. thereby resulting in
an increased level of information sharing. 3?
According to neoliberal theory, international institutions facilitate the emergence
of cooperation. A related tenet of neoliberalism is that institutions, by providing
information, can work to assuage fears of unequal distribution of gains. Institutions can
ensure that gains are evenly distributed over time. In essence, distributional issues, or
relative-gains concerns are essentially the same thing as concerns dealing with iterated
reciprocity-a central focus of neoliberal theory. Neoliberals contend that the solution to
both dilemmas is the formation of institutions that promote the sharing of more perfect
infonnation. 3& Regimes do not enforce rules in a hierarchical manner. Instead, they
reduce the level of uncertainty between nations by altering the transaction costs and by
providing better information to the participants. 39
Aside from the transparent sharing of information between states, another
contingency determining the success of institutions is the size and the structure of
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participatory states. Cooperation is most successful when the initial stage of institution
building involves a small number of states. 40 Once a regime is established on a smaller
scale, it can be maintained and even expanded through patterned behavior and
Jegitimacy.41 Legitimacy leads to the condition that furure payoffs are valued more than
current payoffs, making the incentive to defect today less important since the other
members will retaliate tomorrow. 42 In addition, the neoliberals contend that regimes can
create issue-linkage that further induces states to act according to established rules
instead of defecting in pursuit of short-term gains. States become reluctant to breach an
agreement for fear that retaliation can occur in several different issue areas. 43 Once
regimes are established, neoliberals contend that international norms and procedures can
serve to alter the decision-making process of states, thereby inducing a greater
willingness to cooperate due to greater transparency. In essence, decision making
becomes a j oi TIt process. 44
According to neoliberaJs, the creation of conditions that promote cooperation is
easiest in issue areas of political economy as opposed to those dealing with military
security. According to Charles Lipson:
"It is precisely these problems of mistrust, which spring from cognitive
uncertainty and the danger of surprise, that make cooperation so difficult and
unstable. The dangers of swift~ decisive defection simply do not apply in most
international economic issues. Timely monitoring is important but rarely vital
since most economic actions are reasonably transparent.. .States know that they
can readily verify compliance with economic agreements and will have time to
discuss possible violations and, if need be, adjust to them. 45
Security regimes are few and far between whereas economic issues are usually embedded
in extensive networks of rules. norms, and pre-existing institutions with set
expectations. 46 As a result, the likelihood of successful regime creation in areas of
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political economy is much higher than in areas of military security where the shon-term
threats to survival are much greater. Despite the somewhat limited facial applications of
neoliberal theory, most neoliberallheorists argue that by establishing a connection
between current behavior in a single-play game and future rewards in an iterated game.
cross-issue linkage can lengthen "the shadow of the furure." The "shadow of the future,"
reciprocity, and clear incentives help to determine the ultimate success of a particular
cooperative venture..o17 If these conditions arise in a military security situation or a related
issue area typically associated with "high politics" and a more protracted condition of
anarchy, neoliberals argue that cooperation is still indeed possible.
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The rarity of such

opponunities, however, generally limits neoliberal explanations to issue areas associated
with "low-politics" and epistemic communities such as the environment and the
international political economy.

DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? -YES, BUT
RELATIVE GAINS MATTER MORE
Having briefly outlined the major points of neoliberal and realist theory, the next
question that arises is which theory boasts a greater wealth of empirical evidence
supporting its respective propositions? Given the apparent strength of neoliberalism in
explaining state action within the world political economy, it seems as though
neoliberalism would enjoy an explanatory advantage if tested against cases relating to
international trade.
Robert O. Keohane, one of the founders of neoliberalism, recognizes the difficulty
associated with distinguishing the effects of environmental conditions from the
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international institutions themselves. According to Keohane, it is impossible to find an
ideal experiment to test the impact of institutions. 49 Nevertheless, Keohane responded to
a realist attack on neoliberalism by pointing to empirical evidence presented in Lisa
Martin's Coercive Cooperation that seems to support the prowess of neoliberalism in
explaining state action in international trade. 50 Martin attempts to show that the
involvement of international institutions in economic sanctions results in high levels of
cooperation. For evidence, Martin draws attention to European Community sanctions
against Argentina during the Falklands War. In her analysis, Martin discovered that
states used the EC framework to reduce fears of cheating in the form of violating
sanctions in order to profit from continued trade. 51 According to Keohane, the major
contribution of institutions in this case came in the fonn of issue linkages between EC
budget contributions and the sanctions issue. Keohane contends that the work done by
Martin highlights the superiority of neoliberalism in promoting cooperation through
issue-linkages as well as through prevention of cheating by more conventional means. 52
According to realists, the "most recent variant of neoliberalism is simply realism
by another name.,,53 In other words, the distribution of gains by institutions simply points
to the fact that balance of power, a fundamental component of realism, is really at the
heart of interstate relations. Institutions, on the other hand, ex.ist to facilitate the
balancing process. Moreover, since great powers use institutions to further their interests,
the fact that states devote modest resources to institution formation and maintenance does
not undermine realism.

54

Realists also contend that issue linkages were an important part

of international relations long before institutions achieved relevance. 55 Institutions
matter, but only minimally.
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In order to further prove their point, realists point to several case studies that serve
as empirical evidence supporting the explanatory power of realism in the realm of
international political economy. The cases elucidate the importance of relative gains as a
factor in economic relations. Furthennore, given the fact that neoliberals often
emphasize the efficacy of neoliberal theory in explaining economic relations between
advanced industrialized states, most of the available empirical evidence seems to
contradict neoliberal predictions precisely within those analytical constraints. Joseph
Grieco evaluated American and European Community efforts to implement several
different agreements relating to non-tariff barriers
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trade within the GAIT framework.

He concluded that relative gains represented the main determinant of success. Neoliberal
concerns about cheating played a minor role at best in detennining the final outcome of
the bargaining process. 56 Another case study that recognized the saliency of relative
gains over cheating concerns is that conducted by Michael Mastanduno. Mastanduno
evaluated three specific trade disputes between America and Japan: the FSX fighter
aircraft, satellites, and high-definition television. Similar to Grieco, Mastanduno
concluded that relative-gains considerations have a significant impact on influencing
inter-state relations. 57 The aforementioned case studies serve to undermine the strength
of neoliberalisrn as an explanatory tool regarding the behavior of powerful states in
forming international institutions.

REALISM, NEOLmERALISM AND THE TRIPS REGIME
Gi yen the central point of contention in the neoliberalism vs. realism debate as
the importance of relative and absolute gains in determining state behavior, what is the
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strength of each explanation in relation to TRIPS? Central to the focus of this paper is an
analysis of the decision-making process of states as they evaluate whether to participate
in cooperative arrangements. When viewed in the context of the TRIPs regime, what
light does the realism vs. neoliberalism debate shed on the subject of state behavior?
Although neoliberals agree with realists that anarchy is defined by the lack of a
central governing authority, neoliberalism does not directly account for relative gains.
Neoliberals argue that states are rational. "atomistic" actors that seek to maximize
individual absolute gains while remaining indifferent to gains achieved by others.
According to neoliberals. "cheating" is the main impediment to joint action. The solution
to the neoliberal conception of the cooperation dilemma is manifest in international
institutions that can help states "learn" to cooperate through iterated, transparent
interaction. 58 Relative considerations do not preclude any and all cooperation rather they
suggest that a nation evaluating relative capabilities is more interested in dislribution than
the accumulation of joint benefits. In order to narrow or eliminate gaps between nations,
a state in pursuit of relative gains will seek to reshape cooperative relationships or eschew
them altogether. 59 Through collaboration, states worry that their increasingly formidable
allies in the present could develop into overwhelmingly poweIful adversaries in the
future. Neoliberalism fails to recognize the perceived threats that anarchy poses to states.
Without a central authority to govern international relations. nations fear for survival and
independence. Realists contend that states do not seek to attain the highest possible gain;
instead, they try to prevent others from acquiring greater relative capabilities. Unlike
neoliberalism, realism recognizes two major barriers to cooperation as opposed
state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative gains.

to

one:
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According to realists, hegemonic states are least likely to pursue relative gains in
economic relations with friendly nations due to numerous economic advantages including
size, natural resources, and productive capacity.6o Faced with a tangible military threat to
the physical security of the United States during the Cold War. American policy-makers
pursued a policy supporting rapid economic growth among its allies. For nearly forty
years, the United States tolerated the existence of high trade barriers in both Japan and
Europe. Determining that neither Japan nor Europe would be able to compete
economically with America, the United States embraced a trade policy of reverse
discrimination in which American goods were essentially denied entry into European and
Japanese markets while the U.S. government gave massive amounts of aid to help bolster
production. Instead of pursuing relative gains, the United States determined that
American security was best served through the economic vitality of its allies. As a result,
the U.S. allowed its allies to strengthen their economies at the ex.pense of American
economic interests. Since the United States enjoyed such a large economic advantage
over its allies at the time, and since the Soviet military posed the greatest threat to U.S.
security, economic interests were subjugated in favor of military security.
The end of the Cold War marked the elimination of a serious threat to vital
American interests. The dissolution of the Soviet threat, combined with the relative
economic decline of the United States, worked to elevate the degree of importance
afforded economic security concerns by American policy practitioners. According to
realism, U.S. economic policy toward its allies reflects a greater recognition of relative
gains. The free-riding once tolerated by the United States under the pressures of the Cold
War was no longer feasible during the late 19805 once it was recognized that America
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had slid from its relative economic perch. ReaEst theory posits that as military threats
recede from the international spotlight. a hegemonic state will be less likely to forego
national economic interests in order to promote the collective welfare. 61 An
understanding of hegemonic decline is crucial to a relative gains interpretation of United
States foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War world.
On lhe surface, it would appear as though the United States' decision to create the
TRIPs regime was governed by neoliberal theory. According to neoliberals, U.S. policy
practitioners introduced the TRIPs Agreement at the Uruguay Round in order to establish
an international set of rules that would eventually work to universalize much of the
world's diverse intellectual property systems. Since the TRIPs regime mirrors the
stringent protective standards of the American intellecrual property system, the United
States undoubtedly saw the creation of TRIPs as serving American interests. The
problem with a neoliberal construction of TRIPs results from the fact that a large
percentage of nations at the Uruguay Round negotiations did not initially suppon the
codification of the Agreement. Only in the face of intense U.S. pressure in the fonn of
trade sanctions-threatened and implemented--did reluctant nations finally acquiesce to
U.S. demands. According to many trade scholars, protective IPR systems encourage
foreign investment, thereby injecting large amounts of capital into developing
economies. 62 With this knowledge in mind. developing nations should support the idea
of domestic IPR reform. Neoliberal theory posits that lhe long-term absolute gains that
would accrue to developing nations should provide incentive for nations to cooperate
within the TRIPs regime. The fact remains that many developing nations continue to
circumvent TRIPs standards in order to bolster their comparative advantage relati ve to
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developed nations who are TRIPs signatories. Cheating occurs because of harsh, short
term economic dislocations that accompany domestic IPR reform. Cheating is in a
developing nation's interest because it provides a means for domestic high tech producers
to pirate the goods researched and developed abroad at high costs. The costs of research
and development are too high for many companies in developing nations. Developed
nations on the other hand, enjoy a comparative advantage in high tech R&D. Piracy
enables developing nation companies to compete with foreign producers. 63 According to
neoliberal theory, nations should wam to cooperate within TRlPs because of the incentive
of long-term absolute gains; however, short-term dislocations enable foreign producers

to

capture enormous percentages of developing country markets because of a considerable
comparative advantage in high-tech research and development. It would take domestic
producers years to become competitive with foreign producers even in their home
markets, let alone abroad. This short-term gain in the relative capabilities of developed
nations seems to provide a disincentive for developing nations to accede to TRIPs norms.
Given the apparent explanatory failure of neoliberallheory in this case, it remains to be
seen if realist theory can provide a better explanation.
According to relative gains theory, the United States perceives a future threat to
American high tech industries in the form of increased foreign competition. U.S.
companies, devoting massive amounts of capital to research and development projects,
were failing to recoup the costs of their initial investments due to pirating in foreign
markets. Gi yen the potential military applications of high tech products, coupled with the
large percentage of revenue that the high tech sector contributes to the U.S. economy, it is
in America's interest to arrest this gradual dismantling of relative power. Michael
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Mastanduno, a leading scholar of relative-gains theory, explains the reasoning behind
relative economic gains rather succinctly: "If the concern is that economic interaction
will endanger a country's competitive position economically, we should expect officials
to contemplate and adopt measures associated with strategic trade policy, such as the
targeting or promotion of 'strategic' industries, or the disruption of efforts by other
governments to lend their industries a competitive advantage,,,64 Through piracy,
developing nations erode America's comparative economic advantage in high tech
industries. In order to address this perceived threat to the U.S. economy, the United
States sought to establish international
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that would make diverse foreign IPR

systems offering varying degrees of protection commensurate with high American
standards. As a result of U.S. efforts, the TRIPS Agreement was signed at the Uruguay
Round negotiations in 1994.

Potential For Collaboration
In addition to differing conceptions of international anarchy, neoliberalism and
realism also offer opposing views on the potential for collaboration among advanced
democracies and the place of linkage issues in fostering international cooperation. Both
of these debates help to funher infonn an analysis of the TRIPs regime. Neoliberals
argue that cooperation is more likely between nations that share similar political,
economic, and social systems because cooperative ventures are usually nested in pre
existing joint arrangements within common issue areas. 65 Assuming for the moment that
the aforementioned poslulate is true under certain conditions, it would seem as though
neoliberaJism provides a simple explanation as to why discord exists between developed
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and developing nations. Realists, however, refute this assumption. Although many
counlries from both distinctions possess fundamentally similar political and economic
systems, they are by no means identical in their respective levels of development. The
advanced condition of this neoliberal assumption lends itself well to an analysis of why
economic reform instiruted from an exogenous source on exogenous terms is generally
not welcomed by developing nations. Enforcement of a complex system that mirrors that
of a world superpower will not be flawlessly implemented, let alone upheld. in a
developing nation with an under-developed political system.
The problem with this reasoning from a theoretical standpoint is that it sounds
much like an argument supporting a relative-gains interpretation. A developing nation is
unlikely to allow another country to impose economic regulations that serve to hamper
economic growth in the shon-run. Put another way, one country stands to increase its
gains while the other stands to lose. The developing nation is worse off even before the
developed nation begins to explOit a relatively more favorable investment environment.
In sum, neoliberalism is limited to explaining cooperative relations between advanced

developed nations-- and only under certain conditions.

Issue Linkages
The third debate between neoliberal and realist thought that has special relevance
to the TRIPs Agreement involves linkage issues. According to neoliberals, linkages
within and across issue areas facilitate iterative relationships among states, thereby
increasing the depth of cooperation. Realists, on the other hand, view linkage issues as
detrimental to fostering cooperative relationships. According to realists, if a particular
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state views two issues as linked, then that state will be less-likely to collaborate with
another state if the relationship might produce unequal gains. If two issue areas are
linked, then the state that stands to gain more will gain in two sectors as opposed to one,
thereby doubling the disparity.66 The fungibility of high tech intellectual property-
especially in relation to military applications-- poses a significant challenge to any regime
seeking to control its dissemination and use.
Realist theory and its relative gains component provides an adequate explanation
as to why the United States worked to create the TRIPs regime. Neoliberal theory also
provides a reasonable explanation as to why the U.S. chose to act in the manner that it
did. However, neoliberal theory fails to explain why TRIPs continues to be plagued by
non-compliance and it does not offer a realistic solution to the cooperation dilemma.
According to realism, neoliberaJism fails in this regard because of its incomplete
assessment of the international environment: neoliberalism does not account for problems
of distribution. 67 Relative gains theory goes one step further than neoliberal theory in
providing an explanation as to why the United States initially created the TRIPs regime
and, more importantly, why many developing nations continue to circumvent the norms
established by international agreement.

ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL MODELS: EMBEDDED LIBERALISM,
HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY (HST), AND POST-HEGEMONIC
STABILITY THEORY (PHST)
The economic dislocations that inevitably result from IPR reform represent a
serious impediment in convincing developing nations to accept "international" IPR norms
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voluntarily. According to the theory of comparative advantage, domestic finns in
developing nations will have difficulty competing in high tech sectOrs of the economy
because finns from developed nations have the advantage due to their preeminence in
research and development. To develop high tech industry domestically, developing
nations usually entertain one of two options: 1) the developing nation can impose trade
barriers to shield infant industries from foreign competition; or 2) the developing nation
can allow its domestic companies to pirate foreign technological know-how (i.e.
intellectual property). The first option has not been viable for quite some time, as a
liberal, free-market i!1ternational economic order has been in place since the end of
WWlI. As was witnessed during the late 1980s in the case of Japan, protectionist trade
policies usually result in a trade war with both parties losing in the end.
During the past fifty years, the tenets of free trade promotion have been more or
less fonnally accepted as internationally binding principles. Even after the Cold War,
international economic relations based on open market trade theory have expanded
greatly. In fact, the United States currently pursues a policy promoting free trade as
though it were oftentimes a crusade. U.S. persistence in removing barriers to trade is a
symptom of an international system in which economics has assumed a greater strategic
importance than ever before.
Through U.S. efforts, the first tool commonly used by developing nations to beat
the liberal economic order established after WWll-- trade baniers- is now increasingly
met with overwhelming international disdain. The second policy tool, allowing piracy of
foreign intellectual property, is also seen as a threat to vital U.S. interests by United
States policy makers. U.S. efforts in this issue area, however, have met with much less
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success. A rift between developed and developing nations has arisen over the proper
conception of intellectual property rights.
Although it would appear as though intellectual property right disputes revolve
around competing notions of development theory, the blatant invasion of state
sovereignty that accompanies IPR reform represents the centra! point of contention. The
effects of globalization have seriously eroded state power. Nation-states are increasingly
conslrained in their attempts to influence the flows of capital, the migration of people,
and the dissemination of ideas and culture that have permeated increasingly porous state
borders. Nations struggle to control the mechanisms of globalization in order to bolster
national interests.
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The United States is no exception. American business interests are

promoted through the opening of developing markets to American products produced at a
comparative advantage. American values of democracy and its associated institUlions are
increasingly spread via the Intemet. 69 The American way of life is depicted in American
films and television programs exported around the world. Globalization can be seen as a
threat to American institutions as well as a vehicle for the promotion of U.S. interests at
the same time.
One particular aspect of globalization that originated at Bretton Woods is the
concept of subjugating state sovereignty in favor of greater international cooperation
through international institutions. At Bretton Woods, the United States saw an
opportunity to create a New World Order in its image. By embedding a certain degree of
American power in international institutions. the United States appeared to give up some
sovereign control. In reality, by establishing international institutions where the United
States enjoys a considerable degree of influence and power, the U.S. could ensure its
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position as a hegemon relative to other nations. According to realists, the United States
created certain international institutions in order to promote self-interest.
Considerations of relative power and state sovereignty grew in importance during
the 1980s as the United States found itself in a position of declining economic hegemony.
Through the WTO and the TRIPS regime, the United States hopes to cement its power
relative to potential peer competitors by forcing all nations to adopt an lPR system that
favors United States business concerns. American policy-practitioners are faced with the
challenge of convincing sovereign states that domestic IPR reform is in their best
interests.
Defection from international regimes most often occurs when individual national
interests conflict with the interests of the cooperative venture. Neoliberalism posits that
less-than optimal outcomes in international relations can be surmounted through the
establishment of a binding international agreement associated with an institution that can
monitor and enforce the agreement. Linkage issues, however, suggest that problems of
distribution are much more prevalent in international trade than problems associated with
cooperation-- especially considering America's role as a declining economic hegemon. 70

In other words, sensitivity to relative gains is a much greater factor in evaluating the
outcome of a collaborative effort in establishing a universal standard of IPR protection.
Therefore, relative disparity in the distribution of gains received from participation in
TRrPS. is a more appropriate explanation as to why nations might choose to defect. The
central international trade dilemma is not one of cooperation and collaboration with states
sharing a common interest in a single goal; such a conception overlooks the important
distributional problems associated with linkage issues in international trade.
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The elevation of global intellectual property rights law

[0

developed country

levels will most likely fail to produce a unifonn increase in international economic
welfare. Occupying various levels of development, different nations differ in their
relative abilities to produce innovative products. The creation of lax IPR regimes by
developing nations is seen as an economically reasonable solution to ameliorate the
relative gap in high-tech research and development. From the perspective of developing
nations, an increase in IF protection is seen as disadvantageous to the promotion of
national welfare. According to realists, the problem with a neoliberaJ, collective action
approach to solve the dilemma of international cooperation is that neoliberal theory fails
to recognize the relevant challenge to mulitilateral collaboration: relative-gains.
Neoliberals assume that the benefits from cooperation accrue symmetrically to all states
involved. National interests are rarely symmetrical, and conceptions of how best to
achieve those objecti ves often vary. 7\

EMBEDDED LIBERALISM
According to the writings of John Gerard Ruggie, U.S. policy-makers may have
worked to create TRIPS with the intent of overcoming the relative-gains dilemma of
international cooperation. Ruggie attempts to explain the system of international trade by
applying his "embedded liberalism" model. Unlike neoliberals, Ruggie recognizes the
obstacles to cooperation inherent in an international system where nations are concerned
with relative gains. Unlike realists, Ruggie recognizes that relative-gains considerations
represent only one of numerous factors that may work to influence state behavior. In
determining the motivating factors behind the establishment of international institutions,
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embedded liberalism posits that political variables matter more than the traditional
constraints on collective action. 72 In other words, states are not simply unitary actors
seeking to maximize their individual welfare. Embedded liberalism sees anarchy as a
structure of socially ordered states that define the system as easily as the system works to
define the nation-state. The definition of anarchy is never static.?) As a result, relativegains considerations only matter sometimes, if at all. Myriad factOrs ranging from
domestic politics to state identity also affect the decision-making process of states?J. In
essence, Ruggie's variation on liberal theory anempts to explain what factors help to
mitigate perceived threats to sovereignty that states evaluate when deciding whether or
not to participate in a particular international institution. Embedded liberalism seems to
address the cooperation dilemma that arises between developing and developed nations
when sovereignty is at stake. According to realists, the threat to the sovereignty of
developing nations posed by TRIPS would result in insurmountable obstacles to
cooperation in the fonn of disproportionate relative-gains. Embedded liberalists, on the
other hand, contend that other factors may work to make collaboration feasible.
Embedded liberalism draws from an alternative body of literature that takes direct
aim at the fundamental predictions of realism. This school of thought is known as
conslrUctivism. Constructivism is similar to neoliberalism in that it believes that the
potential for international cooperation is much greater than realists admit. According to
constructi vists:
"A conventional constructivist account of politics operates between mainstream
international relations and critical theory. Conventional constructivism rejects the
mainstream presumption that world politics is so homogeneous that universally valid
generaJizations can be expected to come of theorizing about it. It denies the critical
constructivist position that world polities is so heterogeneous [hat we should presume to
look for only the unique and the differentiating. Contrary to these two approaches,
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conventional constructiVism presumes we should be looking for commumtles of
intersubjecti vity in world politics, domains within which actors share understandings of
themselves and each other, yielding predictable and replicable patterns of action within a
specific context.,,75
Constructivism differs from realism most fundamentally in its conception of international
anarchy. According to constructivists, states are not welfare maximizing entities sharing
similar interests and similar fears. In other words, several different types of anarchic
orders exist. 76
In addition to a markedly more complex definition of anarchy in international
relations, constructivism differs from realism in the way that constructivists posit that
states have different identities which are subject to change. Different identities and their
associated perceptions help to define international relations. Constructivism also differs
from realism in the way that constructivism assumes that states have heterogeneous
interests that are the product of identity. Conversely, realism states that all nations share
the same general interests, thereby making the international realm relatively predictable. 77
Constructivists stale that relational change is possible under certain conditions.
Since constructivism conceives of "identity politics" as a perpetual quest for control over
the power necessary to exert social influence, the potential for change exists so long as
there is diversity.78 Realists contend that material capabilities are the ultimate
determinant of international influence, however, constructi vists argue that discursive
power represents an equally important factor. According to constructivists, the state that
controls the dissemination of ideology, culture, and language will occupy a dominant
position in international affairs. Despite the potential for hegemonic order, change can
occur from the bottom up or the top down. The condition of hegemony does not create
change by itself. To be sure, hegemonic order, with its associated disparity in values,
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ideologies and power between states, does nothing more than create a foundational order
fOf change. 79
Embedded liberalism calls for states to pursue a policy of controlled liberalization
in order to help mitigate the effects of globalization. According to embedded liberalism,
equilibrium can be reached between domestic and international stability. Federal
governmental institutions can coexist harmoniously with international institutions
resulting in improved cooperation and general welfare maximization. Central

to

this

hypothesis is respect for state sovereignty. In order to control the effects of economic
and political integration, individual states must retain a cenain degree of sovereign
power. The mechanisms for control must be normalized to the extent that they become
"embedded" in international relations. 8o Like conventional constructivism, embedded
liberalism recognizes the importance of the "power of practice" or iterated action
combined with a recognizable identity.sl

CRITIQUE OF EMBEDDED LIBERALISM
Given the basic predictions of embedded liberalism, the challenge presented. to
U.S. policy-makers was how to secure a legitimate role for the nation-state in establishing
an international intellectual property rights regime. Under the TRIPS Agreement,
domestic stability is ensured through certain exceptions. Article 27 of TRIPS permits
states to exclude certain goods from patentability where human health and the
environment are threatened. In addition, Provision F of Article 31 states that the use of a
patent "shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
Member authorizing such llse." However, Provision F is limited by Provision H that
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states the following: "the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration of each case,
taking into account the economic value of the authorization."s2 If U.S. policy
practitioners applied the embedded liberalism model to the fonnulation of American IPR
policy, then TRIPS represents an attempt on the part of the U.S. to respect the autonomy
of individual states. Despite limited recognition of individual stale concerns in the
TRIPS agreement, state sovereignty must be sacrificed to a considerable extent in the
sense that a new system of law must be implemented as a condition of acceptance.
Moreover, some states stand to lose disproportionately more than others. Obviously
developing nations stand to gain the most in terms of relative advantage.
According to the embedded liberalism model, nations were to have wide latitude
to intervene in domestic economies to address dislocations resulting from trade
liberalization. The expansion of the WTO into new areas of traditionally domestic policy
threatens to constrain states in their ability to manage the domestic economy
effectively.8) The results of globalization are in effect institutionalized in the form of the
WTO. Not only is state sovereignty in the realm of domestic economic affairs being
eroded by the increasingly free flow of capital, but inrernational institutions have also
usurped a considerable share of state power. In India, this son of social compact includes
the governmental provision of inexpensive pharmaceuticals. Before TRIPS,
pharmaceuticals in India were not patentable. Under pressure from the United States and
other developed nations, India became a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement. B4 As a
result, the cost of pharmaceutical products in India will undoubtedly rise, thereby
inhibiting the government's ability to address the widespread health deficit that plagues
India. A state is unlikely to accede voluntarily to in[emational norms that undermine its
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ability to provide for the general welfare of its citizens. Problems presented by the case
of India and the gradual expansion of the WTO point to the epistemological inadequacies
of embedded liberalism in explaining U.S. efforts to create the TRIPS regime.

In part, neoliberal theory is inadequate because it misconstrues the fundamental
cooperative dilemma facing nation-states. When applied to linkage issues such as
intellectual property rights, the shortcomings of neoliberalism are readily apparent.
Embedded liberalism encounters similar problems when applied to the TRIPS
Agreement. Although embedded liberalism recognizes one of the fundamental
challenges facing cooperative ventures based on linkage issues-sovereignry-- it fails to
provide a compromise between domestic and international spheres of influence.
Globalization has led to an increase in economic freedoms and a related decrease in state
sovereignty. As a result, the distinction between the domestic economy and the
international economy has started to erode. rnternational economic institutions
increasingly handle policy with ramifications for domestic economies. In light of these
global changes, a traditional theory, realism, with its account of relative-gains
considerations within the international political economy, seems to offer the best guide
for explaining U.S. behavior in establishing an international intellectual property rights
regIme.

In response to this immutable trend of globalization, nations seek to secure
economic self-interest through as many mechanisms as possible. A nation may decide to
enact unilateral measures to obtain economic gains. Similarly, if a nation believes that an
international agreement is biased in its favor, that nation will attempt to universalize the
reach of that agreement to increase its influence relative to other nations. According to
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realists, cooperation is indeed possible in international relations. When cooperation does
occur, it occurs as a result of one or more of the Great Powers acting to satisfy national
interesl. Extended, universal cooperation is unlikely in international relations due mainly
to relative-gains calculations made by states when evaluating the international
environment. An imponant distinction exists between an international agreement that
serves the interests of a few Great Powers at the expense of other states, and a truly
universal international regime where all states decide to compromise to achieve improved
colJective welfare. The fanner scenario is known as harmony of interests whereas the
latter example embodies all the trappings of a genuine cooperative arrangement. 85 The
former is consistent with realist thought, whereas the latter is not.
Given embedded liberalism's focus on issues relating to state sovereignty,
combined with its alternative conception of inter-state behavior, it appears to address
some of the important environmental conditions that frame the actions of the United
States in the world political economy. More specifically, in making cenain behavioral
predictions, embedded liberalism recognizes the barriers that state sovereignty poses to
effective international cooperation. Although embedded liberalism ultimately proves
inadequate when applied to this paper's central occupation-the TRIPS regime and U.S.
I.P.R. policy-it nevertheless draws anention to an important obstacle facing any
cooperative effort in international relations.
Several other conditions affecting state behavior when observed in a cooperative
context also deserve attention. One of the central assumptions of this paper is that the
United States was in a period of hegemonic decline during the formative stages of U.S.
IPR policy. This assumption has special relevance to a discussion of relative gains. As
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America's power declined relative to other nations, the United States chose to act in a
particular way. According to realists, the United States was more sensitive to the relative
distribution of power-both military and economic-among the nations of the world.
Relative-gains serve to constrain U.S. policy choices and have a direct effect on resultant
U.S. action. Two related, alternative schools of thought, hegemonic stability theory and
post-hegemonic stability theory, offer different prescriptions for regime formation and
maiOlenance in an international environment marked by the unequal distribution of power
and influence.

HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY AND
POST-HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY
According to proponents of hegemonic stability theory, a condition of hegemony
in the world political economy is defined as a preponderance of material resources. Four
areas of material dominance are especially crucial. A hegemonic state must have control
over raw materials, over the sources of capital, over markets, and a hegemon must enjoy
a competitive advantage in the production of highly valued products. 86 The final criterion
is very appropriate for a discussion of the TRIPS regime and the related role of the
United States in the regime's formation. According to hegemonic stability theory, the
United States enjoys a competitive advantage in the production of high technology goods
and services, therefore, the U.S. established TRIPS in order to promote its status as a
world leader in high tech industries. Hegemonic stability theory also avers that regimes
are formed and maintained by a single, dominant state,8? Once again, the application of
HST to the TRIPS regime seems facile.
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It would appear as though hegemonic stability theory and its predictions about
state behavior go a long way in explaining why the United States worked to establish the
TRIPS regime. Upon further inspection, however, hegemonic stability theory seems a bit
outdated in explaining modern-day international relations. Since the 19705. most
scholars of international relations would agree that the United States did not occupy a
consistent position of hegemony. In fact, the 19705 marked the beginning of a gradual
descent of the United States from a position of dominance that continued into the late
1980s. 88 This assumption is further strengthened when viewed in the context of the
international political economy. The 1980s witnessed a period of protectionism in the
U.S. mainly as a result of the recognition and widespread acceptance of the fact that the
United States was facing increasing competition in international trade from countries like
Japan. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory predict that as long as hegemony is
maintained regime formation and maintenance is a likely occurrence. 89 With several
indicators pointing to a general decline in American hegemony, how does hegemonic
stability theory account for U.S. efforts to establish TRIPS shortly after American policy
makers realized that new competition constrained U.S. action? Hegemonic stability
theory observes that under conditions of weak hegemony, cooperation is much more
difficult. Robert Keohane, a leading scholar of post-hegemonic stability theory, readily
admits that the contention "that hegemony is both a necessary and efficient condition for
cooperation is not strongly supported by the experience of this century."90 In other
words, the contemporary empirical evidence supporting the claims of hegemonic stability
theory is very limited.
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In contrast to hegemonic stability theory, post-hegemonic stability theory, a
modified version of the theory elucidated above, makes certain predictions for state
behavior in an environment of declining dominance. Post-hegemonic stability theory
predicts that as hegemonic conditions deteriorate, the prospects for regime formation
diminish as well, although cooperation is still feasible. In addition, as hegemonic
stability declines, pre-existing international regimes may well continue to flourish. 91
Certain conditions must be in place in order for cooperation to occur in spite of a
deteriorating hegemonic order. The presence of shared interests is an obvious criterion
for the promotion of cooperative agreements. 92 A second, less obvious condition that
may foster participation in an international regime is the existence of conflict.
According to post-hegemonic stability theory, cooperation can arise as a result of
many different factors and combinations of factors, some of which appear contradictory.
A combination of related events and actions can build to establish cellain predictable
relationships that facilitate cooperation-much in the same way that embedded liberalism
describes the formation of common interests. 93

In this conception of the process

through which cooperation is achieved, post-hegemonic stability theory contends that
coercive means and the exploitation of discord among nations, can also be an equally
important factor in explaining why cooperation occurs.
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As control by a dominant state

decreases, the potenti.al for disagreement and conflict increases. Conflict, according to
post-hegemonic stability theorists, is often an essential impetus for cooperation. 95
Post-hegemonic stability theory recognizes a distinction between harmony of
interests and genuine cooperation. Harmony results from one nation's policies, enacted
in pursuit of self-interest, helping to inadvertently fulfill another country's goals. In this

46

son of situation, no adjustments need to be made by either country as a result of the
actions of [he other. Harmony can occur without communication or the exenion of
influence. Cooperation, on the other hand, is accomplished through the alteration of
patterns of behavior. In the case of TRIPS, post-hegemonic stability theory would
contend that U.S. policy, pursued in the course of American interests. served to both alter
behavior and redefine preferences of certain states. Post-hegemonic stability theory
posits that international change may spring from both positive and negative inducements.
In shan. cooperation can result from threats, punishments. and coercion, as well as from
rewards, persuasion, and good example. Cooperation should be viewed as a reaction to
perceptions of actual or potential conflicr.
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According to post-hegemonic stability

theory, TRIPS resulted from a U.S. policy designed to force nations into reforming their
domestic rPR systems in the face of threatened punishment such as trade sanctions.
In defining regimes, post-hegemonic stability theory views regime formation as a
process resulting from the pursuit of individual self-interest. Much like realists.
proponents of post-hegemonic stability theory see cooperation in an anarchic,
decentralized international arena as a difficult, albeit achievable, endeavor. Post
hegemonic stability theory can be distinguished from most liberal theories in that it
allows for the formation of regimes as a result of negative pressures. Similar to realism,
post-hegemonic stability theory recognizes that regimes are established and subsequently
shaped by their most powerful members, often through coercion and threat. Unlike
realism, post-hegemonic stability theory postulates that regimes can also have an effect
on the behavior of state interests since self-interest is a fairly subjective pursuit. Post
hegemonic stability theory simply maintains a slightly more sophisticated conception of
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self-interest in that it allows for the possibility that regimes may be able to affect the
values and ex.pectations of states.
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Although post-hegemonic stability theory and

realism differ in their respective predictions for regime maintenance, as far as regime
formation is concerned, post-hegemonic stability theory essentially embraces the
fundamental assumptions of realism. According to realism, the United States worked to
establish the TRIPS regime in order to reverse or at least arrest the general trend of
declining American dominance relative to its economk competitors in high tech
industrial sectors. According to post-hegemonic stability theory, the United States, in
pursuing its own national interest, created an international regime to further promote
those interests. The prospect of future trade conflict over intellectual property rights,
coupled with declining relative economic power, compelled the United States to take a
hard-line approach vis a vis other nations to coerce, threaten, and punish recalcitrant
nations into acceding to TRIPS standards. Both realism and post-hegemonic stability
theory agree that TRIPS represents an act of self-interest on the part of the U.S. that was
designed to afford the United States a shoTt-term comparative advantage in high tech
goods and services.
Little opposition was presented by America's primary trading partners (Europe
and Japan) as they, too, stood to gain as a result of market liberalization in developing
nations; Europe, Japan, and the U.S. all enjoy a comparative advantage over developing
nations in high tech R&D. According to post-hegemonic stability theory, U.S. policy
resulted in a harmony of interests among the Great Powers which translated into minor
adjustments made on behalf of the EU and Japan in order to make their respective LP.R.
systems accord with TRIPS. The future gains that the ED and Japan stood to receive in
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the form of increased market share far outweighed the costs of modest adjustments (if
any) to their domestic intellectual property right systems. Since the most-developed
nalions of the world possess relatively uniform domestic I.P.R. systems, the TRIPS
agreement proved an anractive proposition with minimal costs and substantial future gain
to actors such as the U.S., Japan, and the EU.
During the 19805, a well-organized, powerful collection of high-tech industry
groups exerted a tremendous amount of pressure on U.S. government officials in an effort
to convince American trade-policy practitioners of the need for increased IPR protection
abroad. A similar phenomenon occurred in other industrialized nations with republican
systems of government, namely Japan, Australia, Canada, West Gennany, France and the
United lGngdom. For example. in 1985, the House of Commons in the u.K. enacted a
more stringent copyright law in the face of unrelenting pressure from the Federation
Against Software Theft (FAST).98 In Japan, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (1\1ITl)
was prevented from instituting a proposal calling for compulsory licensing as a result of
hea,vy criticism from the Japanese computer industry. The Japanese computer industry
was worried about reciprocal actions abroad that might hurt foreign sales. 99 Similar
forms of pressure applied by influential high-tech lobby groups helped shape the policy
preferences of government trade officials in many of the most highly developed
countries.
Shared interests formed the core foundation for the creation of an ambitious
international cooperative effort with far-reaching consequences for most developing
nations. In an era of declining American dominance, TRIPS represents the product of a
general coalescence of individual interests of the most powerful actors in international
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relations. U.S. resolve helped shape the policy preferences of several key states, thereby
initiating a trend toward gradual international change that is presently far from complete.
Brazil played a crucial role in the fonnation of the TRIPS regime. Brazilian
recalcitrance in the face of U.S. pressure enabled American foreign policy practitioners

to

prove to the world the seriousness of U.S. resolve in combating intellectual property
violations abroad. In the case of Brazil, U.S. trade officials applied overwhelming
pressure in the fonn of trade sanctions that served as a wake-up call for developing
nations. As a result of U.S. pressure, Brazil effectively refonned its domestic intellectual
property rights system. More significantly, U.S. action taken against Brazil during the
Uruguay Round talks of GAIT successfully coerced other developing nations to agree to
the new standards established by TRIPS.

IV. CASE STUDIES
PHARMACEUTICAL PIRACY IN BRAZIL
The United States, as the world leader in developing information-intensive
technologies, stands to lose the most from weak or nonexistent IPR protection. During
the 1980s, high technology trade accounted for over half of total trade flows in advanced
industrialized nations. Moreover, the growth of high technology trade eclipses the total
rate of growth for all trade combined. 100 Not surprisingly, inconsistencies in intellectual
property right systems within and between Latin American nations gained the attention of
American trade officials a little over a decade ago. During the late 1980s and early
19905, losses in information-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, entertainment
software, and motion pictures in Latin America cost U.S. businesses an estimated $3.4
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billion each year. Losses to U.S. pharmaceutical firms doing business in Latin America
totaled just under $1.7 billion alone. tOl Latin American consumers purchased pirated
pharmaceuticals from Latin American companies at an average price that was 56% lower
than the price charged for the patented drug in the United States. Latin American
producers managed to transfer these savings onto domestic consumers because they did
not have to incur the costs of researching and developing new drugs. To bring a new drug
to market, the estimated cost is anywhere between $100 million and $500 million. 102 The
total cost of production for Latin American phannaceutical companies who pirate drugs
developed abroad is 134% lower than that paid by U.S. producers. IOJ
Pharmaceutical industries do business in a highly politicized environment.
National welfare, one of the central concerns of any government, is directly related to the
health of a particular country's citizens. Governments are generally confronted with two
obligations-sometimes contradictory in nature-when dealing with the production and
distribution of pharmaceuticals. Developing countries especially must strike a careful
balance between establishing and enforcing high standards for drug safety, efficacy, and
purity, and promoting the development of domestic pharmaceutical production in order to
achieve self-sufficiency and economic development. 104 These two goals are not always
mutually attainable for developing nations with balance of payment problems and very
little regulation of domestic industries. The case of Brazil is a perfect example.

In 1991,450 Brazilian national laboratories earned $928 million (roughly 28
percent of the Brazilian pharmaceutical market) from selling medicines produced only
from copied fonnulas. These drugs were produced at a savings to Brazilian
manufacturers of about $50 million. The figure of $50 million represents the amount that
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Brazilian pharmaceutical pirates would have had to pay for the right to use the patented
chemical formulas if they manufactured pharmaceuticals according to international IPR
standards. lOS Of the 6,000 medicines produced by Brazilian laboratories in 1992, none
were developed in Brazil. All were manufactured in countries that possess a system that
meets at least a minimum international standard of patent proteclion. I06

THE BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE
By turning a blind eye to rampant pharmaceutical piracy, the Brazilian
government, through inaction, helped domestic pharmaceutical producers compete
against large, established multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers for a share of the
Brazilian market. During the early 1980s, Brazil represented one of the largest
consumers of pharmaceuticals in all of Latin America. In fact. in 1980 the Brazilian
market accounted for 36% of [Otal pharmaceutical sales for Latin America. 107 Increased
market share and higher profits inevitably came at a price. The pirated drugs are often of
suspect quality as the copying process is never completely accurate. Although the copied
drugs might end up overly potent, another risk was that the pirated drugs did absolutely
nothing. According to Morton Sheinberg, director of the Sao Paulo-based Arnaldo Vieira
de Carvalho Cancer Institute, "Some imitation products are so innocuous that when
patients take them it is like taking water and sugar."I08 Despite health risks, the Brazilian
government continued to promote the production of pirated phannaceuticaJs--the main
justification being that the health risks were not as immediate a threat to the population as
the inability of most citizens to afford the high-priced pharmaceuticals produced by
foreign companies.
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In an effort to force multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers to lower their
prices. in 1993 the Brazilian government threatened to start producing medicines
exclusively in state laboratories. Believing that the multinational producers would have
to lower prices to match the low prices of the drugs produced domestically by the state,
the Economic Rights Secretariat of the Justice Ministry also threatened heavy fines
against any pharmaceutical companies thal refused to lower their prices. 109 This short
Jived policy was obviously flawed in its lack of economic comprehension of fundamental
cost analysis. It points to the fact that the Brazilian government of the early 1990s did
not take into consideration the costs incurred by multinational pharmaceutical companies
who invested millions of dollars in the research and development of pharmaceutical
products. The Brazilian government could afford to manufacture the copied drugs and
sell them at a lower price because they did not have to recoup the costs of hundreds of
millions of dollars in development costs. As long as foreign manufacturers continued to
bring new and innovative drugs to market, the Brazilian government stood to bolster the
economic perfonnance of its domestic producers. From the Brazilian government's
perspective, the general health of its citizens was being met through inexpensive. copied
drugs, and the domestic Brazilian pharmaceutical industry was competing effectively
against large, capital-rich multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers. In other words.
why would Brazil want to strengthen its intellectual property rights laws?

THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
One major concern of United States policy makers in their evaluation of different
Latin American IPR systems, is the apparent lack of a uniform system of laws to provide
an adequate degree of protection. Another obstacle in the way of effective IPR protection
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is the failure of Latin American governments to provide effective enforcement of pre
existing laws. Latin American governments not only fail to enforce existing laws, but
they oftentimes encourage pirating as well. Common tactics used in weakening lPR
protection include issuing compulsory licenses (foreign firms must license products to
domestic firms if they wish to sell that particular product within the domestic market),
allowing parallel imports (allowing competitors who have acquired the right to use a
patent in a foreign market to sell a copy of the product domestically, thereby providing
competition for the patent holder),

\10

and applying a working requirement test (the holder

of a patent must produce or use the innovation within the country, or other domestic
producers may use the license without the patent holder's consent),) t 1 This developing
country view of IPR protection stands in stark contrast to that espoused by the United
States. Developed nations, including the United States, perceive intellectual property
protection as an incentive for individuals to invest the requisite time and resources to
researching and developing new products and processes. In essence, IPR protection is a
reward for creativity. In exchange for releasing infonnation about the invention, the
inventor has the right to prohibit others from using the innovation for a prescribed
number of years.

A MULTI-FACETED U.S. STRATEGY
After recognizing the challenges posed to the American pharmaceutical industry
by lax IPR standards in Latin America, United States policy practitioners implemented a
multi-faceted strategy aimed at addressing these concerns. The approach taken with
Latin America in general and Brazil more specifically represented an attempt by the
United States to pressure individual Third World nations to adopt u.S.-style patent laws.
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Pressure was applied to developing countries through the Office of the USTR.
Additionally, intelleclUal property protection became a central component of NAFT A and
will most likely be included in any new regional trade agreement involving the United
States. Most importantly, the United States succeeded in coercing other nations to
include intellectual property protection measures in the Uruguay Round GAIT
negotiations which began in 1986 and ended in 1994. 112
To create an internationally binding minimum standard of protection for
intellectual property rights, the United States proposed the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GA'IT). These minimum standards are enforced through the dispute
resolution system of the World Trade Organization (WTO).113 The choice of GA'IT as
(he location for such an international IPR agreement seemed a little unusual at the time.
The two preexisting international agreements dealing with intellectual property, the Paris
Convention on patents and the Berne Convention on copyrights, are both administered by
the World Intellecrual Property Organization (WIPO) of the United Nations.
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One of

the major shortcomings of the Paris Convention is that it allows member nations to ignore
foreign patents as long as they provide the same treatment to domestic patent holders.
The Paris Convention also failed to address the problem of enforcement because it
required disputes to be settled by the International Court of Justice (lCJ}---an institution
whose decisions are non-binding. 1IS Two other shortcomings of the Paris Convention
enforcement procedures are the reliance on (he voluntary cooperation of any pany
receiving an unfavorable judgement and the lack of a means by which infringing goods
may be seized. 1 16 As an alternative to revision of international IPR requirements. Third
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World nations preferred the use of WIPO negotiation mechanisms. This preference of
developing nations is understandable as they could exercise greater influence in WIPO
matters than they could in a GAIT forum,l17 The underlying explanation for American
recalcilrance in this debate is obvious: the United States wanted to reform the
international IPR regime to its own advantage. To retain conlrol over the reform process,
the United States wanted the regime to be administered by an international institution
over which American trade officials could exert considerable influence.
The purpose of the TRIPS Agreement was to address two primary concerns of the
United States: lack of a uniform system of minimum regulations concerning intellectual
property rights and the nonexistence of strong enforcement procedures that would ensure
compliance by parties

to

the agreement. 118 Under the Paris Convention, domestic law

determined which subjects were patentable. As a result of TRIPS, patentable material is
now determined by international agreement. The TRIPS Agreement borrows two
principles from American patent law: "non-obviousness" and "utility," As a result, the
international standards determining the patentability of subject matter now mirror U.S.
patent law. 119 Article 33 adopts yet another US patent law standard in declaring that
patent protection is valid for twenty years from the date of filing.
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Article 28 of the

TRIPS Agreement effectively prohibits the practice of parallel importation, the patent
workability requirement, and compulsory licensing schemes in its definition of patent
holder rights:
(a) "where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not
having his consent from the acts of: making, USing, offering for sale, selling,
or importing for these purposes that product;
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(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not
having his consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of:
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the
product obtained directly by that process." 121
Brazil's exclusion of patent protection for pharmaceuticals is illegal because Article 27
requires that all parties

(0

the TRIPS Agreement grant patents for innovations in all fields

of technology. 122
While the Articles of the TRIPS Agreement mentioned above transfonned
Brazil's IPR system by imposing internationally agreed upon standards, TRIPS also
established certain requirements in the enforcement of these norms. Just as TRIPS
insulated IPR regulations from national tampering, it also removed the enforcement
mechanism from state control. Pan Three of TRlPS obligates member states to meet
certain standards of national enforcement. This provision states the following: "Members
shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Pan are available under their
laws so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual
property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.,,12J
In other words, Members must allow for fair judicial procedures for civil infringement
suits. These include the right to legal counsel, the ability for claimants

to

present all

relevant evidence, and the right as a defendant to receive timely written notice. 124 TRIPS
requires that judicial authorities have the power to grant injunctions, 125 remove infringing
goods from channels of commerce, 126 and award damages and expenses. 127 In addition,
administrative mechanisms must enable authorities to stop the impoI1ation of counterfeit
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goods at the border. 128 These enforcement provisions were established in order to
guarantee that they do not act as barriers to trade, and to make sure that they are readily
available to patent holders. 129
A second important component of the TRIPS enforcement mechanism is the
transparency requirements set forth in Article 63. According to this article, all
administrati ve rulings, regulations, laws, and judicial decisions must be published in
order to ensure that all parties to the Agreement have access to them. Whenever new
laws are enacted that have any bearing on Agreement, the TRIPS Council must be
notified and any relevant information must be sent to all of the Members. The
transparency requirements of Article 63 are a crucial component of TRIPS in so far as
they facilitate compliance with the established standards of the Agreemenl. 130
The third prong of the enforcement mechanism established by TRIPS utilizes the
dispute resolution system of GAIT to fiJI in the gaps left by the Paris Convention and the
Berne Convention. Under the 1994 WTO Agreements, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) was expanded to cover the TRIPS Agreement. The DSU aJtered
the old system of dispute resolution by establishing rights to the following: a panel; in the
absence of a consensus to reject, the adoption of panel reports; appellate review of panel
decisions, and time limits upon which a member must comply with a final ruling.
According to the DSU, a Member must either alter the repugnant measure or negotiate a
compensatory settlement if a final ruling is made. Trade sanctions may be allowed if the
offending Member refuses to change the measure or fails to compensate the applicant.
RetaliatOry measures may only be applied in the "same sector" in which the original
violation occurred. 13 !
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Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the United States could not rely upon multilateral
mechanisms to force countries to accede to U.S. IPR norms. As a result, during the
1980s and early 1990s the United States acted unilaterally in order to achieve its foreign
policy objectives regarding intellectual property rights. When the US opts to take
unilateral action, it often occurs under the authority of section 182 (amended in 1988) of
the Omnibus Trade Act of 1974, commonly known as "special 301.,,132 It was through
the use of Special 301 that the United States succeeded in convincing Brazil to reform its
domestic IPR system so as to bring the nation more in line with acceptable international
norms.
Under the Reagan Administration, the USTR formulated a policy under which
the United States would work to expand multilateral discussions. while continuing to
engage countries in bilateral agreements and intensifying unilateral pressures. In relation
to intellectual property rights, this change in policy called for a moving away from the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Progress toward IPR reform had
stalled under the oversight of WIPO. In order to address the inadequacies of WIPO, with
the support of American industries, the USTR introduced a new initiative at the GAIT
Uruguay Round. In conjunction with this new multilateral effon, the United States
stepped up its unilateral IPR protection vigilance. I))
Under the authority of Section 301, the USTR began placing countries that failed
to provide adequate IP protection on "watch lists" and "priority watch lists." Once

placed on a list, a country received notification that if they failed to institute IP reforms,
then the United States would impose trade sanctions in the form of tariffs on the target
country's exports to the United States. 134 The United States also utilized state and private
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delegations in the diplomatic sphere as tools to apply additional pressure. Furthermore, a
series of linkages were made between intellectual property and International
Development Bank loans and the funding of joint scientific projects. Many countries
changed their behavior just to avoid being placed on one of the lists in the first place.
Brazil, however, decided to test the Americans' resolve by refusing to alter its IPR
practices after receiving notification of its designation as a "priority country."
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In October 1988, the United States acted on its trade sanction threats in relation to
Brazil's stubborn refusal to institute adjustments in its domestic IPR system. Following a
period of negotiation, the Reagan Administration imposed 100% tariffs on thirty-nine
million dollars worth of Brazilian imports to the United States. The US government
justified this figure by equating it to the market loss suffered by US pharmaceutical
makers arising from Brazil's lack of protection for pharmaceutical patents. In retaliation
to US sanctions, Brazil denounced America's actions as contrary to the basic premise of
GAIT. The version of GAIT at the time of the dispute required member states to senle
disputes through the GAIT dispute settlement rnechanism.
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The sanctions, coupled with a change in Brazilian government, succeeded in
instigating the reform of Brazil's patent laws by 1990. Despite some progress, Brazil's
efforts did not satisfy the United States. Brazil convinced the United States to remove the
sanctions by promising to offer pharmaceutical patent protection "when it was politically
possible." Despite this assurance, Brazil did not undergo substantial legal refoIm until its
new Industrial Property Law was passed in 1994. 137 This legislation was only introduced
after the US had placed Brazil on its priority watch list in 1991 and 1992 and deSignated
Brazil as one of the worst offending countries in 1993. 138 This legislation effectively
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restructured Brazil's domestic IPR legal system. Under the old system (unlike CD
pirating in China) phannaceutical companies in Brazil were not violating domestic law
by producing counterfeit drugs and other pharmaceutical productS. 139 Before terminating
its investigation, the USTR also made sure that the Brazilian government obtained
congressional approval of the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, including the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. As a result of lackJuster
progress between February of 1994 and April of 1995. Brazil was placed on the Priority
Watch List again in April 1995. By April I?, 1996,lhe Brazilian Congress passed a new
patent law that provided patent protection for pharmaceutical products in addition to
prohibiting parallel impons. Satisfied by the Brazilian government's effons to reform its
domestic lPR system the USTR removed Brazil from its previous designation as a
"priority country."I,£() Through external pressure, the United States succeeded in coercing
Brazil to reform its IPR system by adopting a regulatory regime mirroring the more
slringent U.S. system. This objective was achieved largely as a result of the "special
301" provision of the 1974 Omnibus Trade Act.
In formulating IPR policy toward Brazil, the United States hoped to achieve two
objectives: continue to develop a more uniform standard of IPR protection among Third
World nations, and improve the level of enforcement presently applied to domestic IPR
laws. Through the American Uruguay Round proposal, U.S. policy-makers hoped to
achieve both of the aforementioned goals on an unprecedented international scale. By
forcing Brazil to take a more responsible approach in protecting intellectual property
rights just before the vote on whether to adopt the TRIPS proposal, the United States used
Brazil as an example of the lengths
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which the American government was willing to go
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in order to improve IPR protection. In effect, the United States demonstrated to the
world that it was willing to use aggressive unilateral measures in order to convince
developing nations to implement strict IPR systems. At the Uruguay Round negotiations.
the United States essentially presented Third World nations with an ultimatum: either
adopt the TRIPS agreement or face the threat of severe economic sanctions.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT REFORM IN BRAZIL:
THE AFfERMATH
Overall, U.S. efforts to elevate the degree of protection afforded intellectual
property in Brazil are viewed as a success. The Brazilian pharmaceutical market is now
the fourth largest in the world with sales of over $8 billion. By demonstrating to the
world that the Brazilian government is committed to complying with the TRIPS
Agreement. Brazil's markets have been flooded by U.S. goods. 14J The implementation of
more stringent Brazilian IPR laws corresponded with a marked decline in sales growth of
the Brazilian phannaceutical industry. Domestic IPR reform coincided with a sweeping
change in economic policy that called for increased market liberalization. From 1996 to

1997. sales growth fell from a figure of 17.2 percent to 6.8 percent. Sales of domestically
manufactured phannaceuticals continued to increase at a decreasing rate in 1998. In
1999, sales rebounded exponentially to a year-end figure of 26.2 percent. 142 With a
landmass larger than the continental United States and over 160 million people residing
within its borders, the opportunities for continued expansion of the Brazilian
pharmaceutical market are substantial. 143 From the perspective of the United States, the
increased market share garnered by American pharmaceutical companies can be viewed
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as a foreign policy success. In effect, forcing Brazil to adopt a higher standard of
intellectual property right protection helped to satisfy the long-term objective of the
USTR, which is to secure a dominant position in global trade for American high tech
industry. Although Brazil's pharmaceutical manufacturers suffered an initial loss in sales
momentum as a result of the more stringent IPR standards, signs of recovery have
appeared in the relatively short period of just two years. l 4.J.
The sales growth of the Brazilian pharmaceutical market is largely attributable to
an influx of products from multinational pharmaceutical companies. With the passage of
the Brazilian Industrial Property Law and TRIPS, multinational pharmaceutical
companies can attain a monopoly on their new drugs in the Brazilian market for the term
of the patent, thereby eliminating the potential for massive profit losses resulting from
piraling. 145 Under the new laws, large multinational firms enjoy a considerable
advantage over Brazil's domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers who have until recently
subsisted largely through pirating drugs manufactured abroad. Massive amounts of
capital must be invested in researching and developing new drugs before Brazil's
pharmaceutical companies will be capable of competing in their home market, let alone
in foreign markets. Reform of Brazil's lPR system carne form an exogenous source, and
it was implemented from the top down. According to one construction of development
theory. a country reaches a middle stage of development when its infrastructure has
matured to the point where improved technology can be used to pirate patents. Given the
similarities between the aforementioned description and Brazil's economy, Brazil can be
characterized as a middle-tier developing nation. The final stage of development occurs
when a particular nation's domestic industry achieves the capacity to produce world-class
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products, thereby rendering it profitable for the country to institute adequate patent
protection. Wi Brazil's economic potential has not yet been realized as a result of market
volatility,147 yet patent refonn associated with the final stage of development has
nevertheless been implemented. As a result, Brazil's domestic pharmaceutical market is
dominated by multinationals from the United States and Europe. Although increased IPR
protection within Brazil increased the overall profitability of the phannaceutical market,
it did so at the expense (at least in the short-term) of Brazil's domestic phannaceutical
manufacrurers.

Shortcomings of American IPR Policy
The case of Brazil points out several shortcomings of U.S. lPR policy. If the
consideration of relative gains is the motivating factor for United States IPR policy, then
several problems arise from this particular theoretical construction. A multilateral regime
created in order to secure a condition of unequal power between nations creates inherent
participatory clisincentives. The only effective way for the United States to coerce
recalcitrant nations into joining the TRJPS Agreement is for the U.S. to employ unilateral
sanctions. Unilateral trade sanctions. however, will only work to undermine the
international institutions that the United States uses to ilS advantage, namely the WTO
and its predecessor (GATT). By delegitimizing the power of the WTO, the U.S. will
essentially undermine one of the fundamental components of the TRIPS Agreement.
Brazil was seen as an anomaly in the grand IPR strategy of the United States.
Unilateral sanctions were utilized to prove to other nations the resolve of the United
States regarding intellectual property right protection. The adoption of TRIPS was
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supposed to be the end-all solution to address lax international IPR standards. TRIPS
was to eliminate any future need for unilateral sanctions to coerce nations to adopt a
greater degree of IPR protection. Despite the fact that relative gains considerations seem
to have provided the initial impetus for U.S. action, American policy-makers appear to
have embraced liberal or neoliberaJ assumptions in formulating the TRIPS regime. The
nature of intellectual property rights protection. since it can be conceived of as a linkage
issue in which changes involving IPR's are fungible across other areas of national interest
(such as economic vitality and military security). poses a unique set of problems to U.S.
policy.
American manufacturers face little or no competition from Brazilian producers
because these companies have been operating under the assumption that capital need not
be allocated to research and development. After Brazil adopted a new industrial patent
law, Brazilian phannaceutical companies found themselves at a tremendous disadvantage
relative to foreign manufacturers.
According to Game theory, nations seek to maximize their welfare through
international trade. but are faced with a Prisoner's Dilemma. 148 In a zero-sum game, a
nation will try to profit at the expense of others by manipulating trade policy with the
objective of increasing exports while simultaneously restricting imports. Collective
welfare suffers as a result of individual nations pursuing isolated, rational strategies.
According to this theory, TRIPS is understood as an agreement that seeks to overcome
the problems associated with concerted action on an international scale. Once TRIPS was
adopted by the member-nations of the WTO. the United States hoped that unilateral
action would no longer be necessary as all IPR disputes would be multilateral in scope.
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TRIPS represents a neoliberal solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma. U.S. policy
makers were convinced that to eliminate the possibility of defection and gain the higher
payoffs associated with cooperation, states will try to establish international norms,
procedures, and institutions. The United States hoped to be able to influence state
behavior through the creation of an international framework based on American
standards. U.S. policy practitioners sought to overcome the problem of cooperative
action presented by an international playing field governed by realism. Since states are
the primary actors in an anarchic arena, state behavior is seen as the focal point of policy
formation. Assuming that individual states represent rational, welfare-maximizing actors
with both common and conflicting interests, interstate cooperation is therefore a difficult
achievement. Nevertheless, proponents of neoliberalism contend that collective action is
indeed possible as long as the potential for "cheating" is minimized. 149
Given (he failure of the neoliberal collective action model and the embedded
liberalism model in providing a sound rationale for U.S. efforts to establish an
internationally binding IPR regime, it seems as though a multilateral approach is
ineffective in achieving U.S. interests. As is illustrated by the case of Brazil, recalcitrant
nations can only be persuaded to reform their domestic IPR systems under relentless
unilateral pressure from the United States.
Voluntary acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement is unlikely in many developing
nations because of the economic dislocations that result from domestic IPR reform. Even
if a particular nation does not view the TRIPS Agreement as an insuperable invasion of
sovereignty, few incentives exist to entice that nation into reforming its domestic IPR
laws. Furthermore, the TRIPS grace period that distinguishes between different levels of
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development, enables nations to self-identify themselves as less-developed in order to
enjoy a longer period of time in which they can continue to take advantage of lax IPR
laws. This mechanism creates an additional disincentive for prompt compliance.
Another reason why a multilateral approach is not applicable in dealing with
linkage issues, is the fact that United States behavior was predicated on relative gains
considerations. Linkage issues inherently involve distributional considerations-in other
words, sensitivity to relative gains. Given America's position as a declining economic
hegemon, coupled with an international environment marked by a diminished military
threat to American security, it stands to reason that the U.S. was more aware of the
relative economic standing of its allies. The idea of a multilateral regime created as a
result of relative gains considerations seems somewhat contradictory. An international
institution established to perpetuate an unequal distribution of power between nations
inevitably creates serious disincentives for participation. So far, the only way that the
U.S. has successfully coerced non-compliant nations to join the TRlPS Agreement is
through involuntary persuasion, accomplished via unilateral trade sanctions. The use of
unilateral mechanisms will only serve to undermine the liberal international economic
order that the United States created in order to further its interests.
If it is assumed that American hegemonic power will only decline further, the
U.S. will rely more and more on multilateral institutions as a source of international
influence. The ability of the United States to shape nations' behavior using unilateral
measures will decline in tandem with America's status as a hegemon. If the United
States has truly regained its status has world economic hegemon, then the United States
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should have no problem persuading nations to join and then adhere to the TRIPS regime.
The case of China. however, continues to confound U.S. trade officials.

CASE STUDY: COMPUTER SOFTWARE PIRACY IN CIDNA
The case of Brazil highlights some of the central problems facing U.S. efforts to
achieve universal compliance with TRIPS standards. Many of the nations that have not
acceded to a higher degree of intellectual property protection can be characterized as
developing nations with limited resources and particularized problems resulting from
underdeveloped infrastructures. judicial systems. and market controls. The People's
Republic of China is no exception.
Inherent impediments to effective IPR implementation and enforcement in China
arise out of its status as a developing nation. China has a decentralized government with
authority over a billion citizens. Its market economy is in a relatively nascent stage of
development and is still not completely free from manipulation by the communist state
apparatus. Unlike Brazil, China must strike a balance between a markedly non-Western
cultural and historical tradition and an embryonic Western economic system. In Brazil.
the intellectual property right dispute was defined along a divide between developing and
developed nations. In China, the concept of intellectual property regulation runs contrary
to cultural and histOrical experience in addition to facing the added obstacle of short-term
economic disincentives as they relate to development. China presents a dilemma for U.S.
trade practitioners that is at once very similar to that posed by Brazil yet more enigmatic
in several respects. China is not yet a member of the WTO; therefore, the dispute
resolution system for trade disputes is not a viable option in Sino-American relations.
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Although China is not a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement, China has improved its
intellectual property right system to accord to many of the standards emphasized in the
Agreement. China has also made a commitment to the Berne Convention in addition to
several bilateral agreements with the United States. On paper, China boasts quite a
sophisticated intellectual property rights system; however, enforcement of IPR standards
within the People's Republic of China has proven unsatisfactory to American interests.
At stake for the United States is the future legitimacy of the TRIPS Agreement as well as
billions of dollars in potential trade revenue.
American high tech industries, representing a crucial sector of the U.S. economy,
depend heavily upon the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights. Because of
the importance of American high tech industries to overall U.S. economic vitality,
American foreign policy practitioners see the promotion of IPR rights in the expanding
Chinese market as an important objective. According to a study penonned by
Economists Inc., in 1995, the U.S. copyright industries accounted for foreign sales and
exports of $53.25 billion. This figure places intellectual-property-dependent U.S.
industries third in overall export revenue behind the automotive and agricultural sectors.
The report also states that core American copyright industries accounted for 3.78% of
U.S. gross domestic GDP or 254.6 billion in value added.. In addition, between 1987 and
1994, industries reliant on intellectual property protection grew twice as fast as the rest of
the economy with a growth rate of 4.6% vs. 2.3%. This trend was also visible in job
creation: between 1987 and 1994, core copyright industries created twice as many jobs as
the rest of the economy combined (2.85% vs. 1.25%). With total revenue of $385.2
billion, core copyright industries accounted for 5.72% of U.S. GDP. ISO According to
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these figures. industries reliant upon intellectual property protection for their products
and services represent an increasingly influential sector of American business with
important ramifications for future American economic growth.
In 1997. estimated total Josses to the U.S. copyright industries in China as a result
of piracy amounted to nearly $2.8 billion. This figure represents an increase of $500
million from the previous year's estimated losses of $2.3 billion. Losses to the computer
software industry accounted for nearJy $2.4 billion of the tmal. 151 In 1998, America had
the largest percentage of total software losses resulting from piracy out of any country,
with lost revenue estimated at $3.2 billion. This figure represents 28% of total losses
worldwide. 152 U.S. companies producing compu£er programs with business applications
lost an estimated $987.9 million. and the entertainment software industry lost $1.409
billion. 153 In 1996. the losses to the business software industry amounted to $506
million, and the entertainment software industry lost $1.37l billion.
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Although the

United States is the world leader in the value of software copyright violations. an
estimated $2.4 billion a year (1997 estimate), this figure represents a small percentage of
the total U.S. software market. China is third behind Japan ($1.2 billion) with a figure
estimated at $700 million. 155 The percentage of China's total software market that is
cornered by pirates, however. is extremely high. The estimated piracy level for the
business software market in China rose from 95% of the market in 1996 to 96% of the
market in 1997. A one-percent decrease in the piracy level of the entertainment software
market occurred between 1996 and 1997 (96% vs. 97%).156 Positive change is generally
non-existent. and. where visible, is barely discernible.
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Between 1983 and 1994, trade between the U.S. and China became severely
unbalanced. In 1983, the U.S. trade deficit with China was $70 million and by 1994, the
deficit had soared to $30 billion. During the same period, Chinese exports to the United
States increased from $3.1 billion to $38 billion, but American exports to China only
increased from $3 billion to $9 billion. 157 For the most part. China exports more high
tech products to the United States than America sells to China. For example, in 1995.
China exported $1 billion worth of computers to the U.S. whereas the U.S. only exported
$267 million in computers to China. I58 The Chinese are also exporting pirated software
abroad for sale in markets around the world, thereby undercutting U.S. prices. On
September 12, 1995, in the notorious "Golden Shopping Arcade" in Shamshuipo, one
could purchase a CD-ROM with a collection of software for Windows 95 valued at more
than $30,000 for $100. 159 In 1995, China exported $50 billion in pirated discs. 160 Lax
customs regulations in China only comprise half of the problem facing American policy
practitioners: in the past five years, the number of people with Internet access has
increased exponentially. The Internet provides a perfect vehicle for the dissemination of
software around the globe in a matter of seconds. 161 With estimated trade losses resulting
from Chinese piracy amounting to billions of dollars, the United States has considerable
incentive to ensure the effective enforcement of Chinese intellectual property rights.
The United States relied heavily on the export revenue of intellecrual property
products and services to offset its trade deficits in world markets. l62 The size of the
Chinese market coupled with its potential for future growth represents an important target
of U.S. trade policy in promoting increased American high tech investment.
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To secure the benefits of high tech investment in China, a reasonably stable intellectual
property rights system must be in place so as to guard against substantial revenue losses
resuiting from piracy. Beginning in the early 1980s, the United States applied increasing
amounts of pressure in an effort to coerce China into adopting more stringent intellectual
property right norms. As the trade deficit between the U.S. and China climbed upward,
the United States assumed a progressively less-accommodating posture toward China.
Throughout the early 1990s, U.S.-China trade relations nearly deteriorated into an all-out
trade war on several occasions. The decline of United States trade dominance gave rise
to concerns of relative economic gains and their effect on the future of American
economic growth. 163
This chapter explains the evolution of intellectual property law in China,
concentrating on three distinct periods in Chinese history: the pre-Maoist era (prior to
1949); [he Maoist era (1949-1979); and final I y the present period of IPR development.
The last section will be the focus of much of this case study as the role of the United
States is central in contemporary IPR development within China. The implementation of
an effective intellectual property system must overcome two hurdles: cultural differences
that arise out of different philosophical foundations and governmental differences
resulting from unique organizational and structural considerations. In an effort to explain
why the idea of intellectual property is so foreign to the Chinese people, the first two
sections will focus on the philosophical underpinnings of Chinese culture. Both
Confucianism and Maoism embody philosophical orientations that are decidedly
incompatible with the Western concept of intellectual property. In the last section, after
looking at the evolution of China's contemporary intellectual property system and the
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role of the United States in instigating change, the problems associated with China's
system of administrative government will be expounded upon in the context of efforts to
protect intellectual property.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA W IN CHINA:
PRE-1949
Intellectual property law in China did not exist as a formal institution until the
early pan of the 20 th Cenrury, which is when some formal protection was granted by the
state. 1M During the Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.), printing first appeared in China and
with it came the arrival of copyright requirements. Unlike Western societies, however,
copyright law was used in China to ensure the review of works prior to publication for
purposes of protecting the monarchy from seditious literature. In other words, the
Chinese government used copyright law to prevent the proliferation of "dangerous"
printed materials-not as a means to guard against the unauthorized reproduction of
workS. 165 In 1910, the Emperor enacted the first written starute dealing with copyright,
known as the Da Qing Copyright Law. Literature, art, photographs, and pamphlets were
protected under the statute. In addition, the statute dealt with oral works and translations,
commissioned works, ownership, inheritance, and works of joint authorship. Protection
was granted until thirty years after the author's death. This rather sophisticated statute
lasted nearly forty years until the Communists founded the People's Republic of China in
1949 and subsequently abolished all copyright statutes.

l66

The ea,riy period of intellectual property right development in China was defined
by another factor other than lack of government protection: Confucianism. Confucianism
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goes back 2500 years in Chinese history. Central to the teachings of Confucianism is the
concept of learning by copying. To be sure. for thousands of years the copying of various
works has been regarded as necessary and sometimes as a polite fonn of flattery,l67
Confucianism also emphasizes the good of society rather than the pursuit of individual
accolades. The confrontational or litigious nature of rule by law contradicts one of the
core philosophical underpinnings of Confucianism: that the moral development of the
individual-not a system of law-is crucial to maintaining social order. 168 Two central
components of a philosophy that was ingrained in Chinese society for over 2500 years are
completely repugnant to the ideological foundation of intellectual property.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA:
1949-1979
In addition to Confucianism, Maoist thought was another philosophy that had a
profound effect on the development of intellectual property rights in China. When the
Communists took over in 1949. Chairman Mao promptly expelled all foreign influence
and abolished any semblance of a formal copyright system,169 Under the rule of Mao
Tse-Tung, law was viewed as a mechanism for the oppression of enemies of the state.
Maoism stipulated that the masses should have access

to

creative works as long as those

works were not critical of the State. 170 In fact, barely a year after gaining power the
Communists issued a directive stating that all inventions were to be considered state
property,l71 The aforementioned tenet of Maoism is borrowed directly from traditional
Marxism, which contends that the renunciation of private property promotes economic
growth. According to the Communists in China, the protection of copyright could be
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used as a politically manipulative tool of the state to ensure that opposition could not gain
an effecti ve voice. As a result, the Communists could gradually construct an advanced
socialist culture and society while fostering the growth of state-sponsored scientific
research and industrial development. The interests of the state enjoy primacy. Nowhere
present in the People's Republic of China's copyright law of the Maoist Era is the
concept of individual gain or the protection of individual interest. 172 The normalization
of relations between the U.S. and China in 1979 marked a fundamental shift in the
attitude of China's government toward intellectual propeny.

u.s. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CHINA'S INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEM: 1979
In 1979, the United States and China signed a fonnal trade agreement
establishing cenain conditions governing relations between the two nations. Under the
agreement, both governments were to offer a degree of protection to patents and
trademarks roughly equivalent

(0

the amount of protection afforded by the other party. 173

In other words. both countries agreed to maintain relative equality in the degree of
copyright protection granted within their respective borders. The signing of the 1979
trade agreement between the United States and China helped induce the Chinese
government to increase the level of protection afforded to intellectual property by
enacting several regulatory statutes. The Technological Contract Law of China. the Law
of Scientific and Technologlcal Progress of China, and the Law on Combating Unfair
Competition were all passed in the years immediately following the 1979 agreement. 174
China adopted the Trademark Law in 1982 and the Patent Law in 1984, and the
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Copyright Law in 1991. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Protection of
Software followed shortly after the passage of the Copyright Law. 175 In 1993, China
enacted the Unfair Competition Law. 176 Another measure taken by China to
institutionalize IPR protection domestically is the creation of a new system of courts
designed specifically to handle intellectual property disputes. China has since joined
numerous international IPR conventions including the Paris and Berne Conventions, the
Madrid Agreement for International Registration of Trademarks, and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).177
By the late 1980s, conflict between the United States and China loomed large, as
an escalating trade imbalance between the two nations threatened

to

disadvantage

American induslries. Despite China's anempt to institute new provisions for the
protection of intellectual property, high tech commodities remained susceptible to
widespread piracy within the Chinese market. In the face of this threat to American
economic vitality, U.S. foreign policy practitioners decided to step up the pressure on
China's government to coerce the Chinese into taking a more aggressive approach when
combating piracy.
During the 1980s, the rampant intellectual property right violations occurring in
nations such as China and Brazil revealed the inadequacies of the pre-existing
international intellectual property conventions. Provisions set forth in the Berne and
Paris Conventions failed to establish substantive standards of protection and neither
treaty was effective in providing a mechanism for dispute senlement. U.S. trade policy
makers endeavored to formulate a two-part strategy that would create a multilateral
mechanism to fill in the loopholes of the outdated international IP agreements, while
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simultaneously applying unilateral pressure through threats of trade sanctions. While
working to establish the TRIPS Agreement during the Uruguay Round Talks of GATT,
the United St.ates attempted to address the problem of intellectual property piracy in
China by applying pressure unilaterally. With the Section 301 Amendment added to the
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, the Office of the USTR was poised to
tum up the pressure on the Chinese government.
Despite China's effort to integrate international norms while strengthening itS
intellectual property system. American businesses remained unsatisfied with China's
progress. Mounting pressure from American lobby groups and high-tech industry
organizations helped in convincing the USTR to designate China a "priority country"
even after the passage of Chi na' s first comprehensi ve copyright act in 1990.
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The

PRe's Copyright Law codified basic rightS and requirements dealing with the
requirement of a written contract for licensing, liability of infringers, the inheritance of
copyright, and the creation of enforcement agencies. Through China's acceptance of
multilateral intellectual property treaties, foreign authors were also covered under the
provisions of the Copyright
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Despite the moderately ambitious nature of the new

Act, it nevertheless failed to cover several key areas of concern to U.S. businesses. A
major loophole in the Act allowed for considerable governmental discretion in
determining what intellectual property deserved protection based on the state's
conception of the "public interest." In effect, the ambiguous wording of this clause
allowed for government manipulation of the ex.isting laws if the government deemed the
intellectual property to be contrary to the interests of the state (i.e. if it served to
undermine state objectives). A second concern of American businesses. especially the
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software industry, was the Act's lack of protection for computer software: computer
software was not included as a protected literary work. A third point of contention was
the clause that stipulated that in order to receive protection, software must be
"published", or produced, in the PRC first Finally, many American business interests
were quick to point out that the Act failed to impose criminal sanctions for copyright
violations. I so The United States threatened to apply lrade sanctions unless China
provided a higher degree of protection for U.S. intellectual property, especially computer
software. lSI

THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE PROTECTION OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The trade dispute between the United States and China led to the signing of a
more extensive intellectual property agreement known as the Memorandum of
Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property (MOU). The pact was
unprecedented in that it contained provisions that dealt explicitly with enforcement
measures as well as the actual imposition of new regulations. Under the MOU, China
agreed to implement several core concepts of Western law as they related to the
protection of copyright infringement and computer software. 182 It was hoped that by
committing to the points of the MOU, China would eventually develop into a legitimate
producer of intellectual property, thereby discarding the embarrassing distinction of being
the world's most egregious offender of intellectual property rights. IS3 Just as much as
China wished to avoid a potentially harmful trade war with the United States, China was
also very concerned with maintaining its image as an important player in the international

arena.
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The terms of the MOU required that China join the Berne Convention and the

Geneva Phonograrns Convention. China joined both agreements by April 30. 1993. In
order to address the concerns of the American software industry, China passed the
Software Regulations in October of 1991, which included software as a literary work and
extended (he period of protection to fifty years. ISS

THE 1995 ACTION PLAN AND THE 1996 AGREEMENT ON THE
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A year after the MOU had been signed piracy in China was more widespread than
ever. Although the Chinese government had instituted significant refoon of its domestic
legal system to include new Western-style regulations, many of the enforcement
mechanisms had not yet been fully implemented. Lack of action by China's government
attracted the concern of both U.S. government and industry leaders. After the failure of
twenty-one separate attempts at negotiations with Chinese government officials. the
USTR, Michael Kantor, placed China on the Priority Watch List. 186 According to the
Office of the USTR, recalcitrance regarding enforcement by the Chinese government was
particularly abysmal in the following areas: "internally inconsistent laws; a lack of
Lransparency in the enforcement structure; a lack of protection for existing works; gaps in
responsibility in the enforcement structure; a lack of funding, training, and education; the
absence of clear and effective criminal penalties; possible conflicts of interest;
burdensome and discriminatory agency requirements; overly-broad compulsory licensing
provisions; failure of enforcement authorities to

coordinat~;

and the absence of an

effective border mechanism.,,187 Only a tiny number of intellectual property infractions
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actually made it before Chinese courts and the USTR found a "lack of consistent
application of the laws throughout the central, provincial and local governments.,,188
After finding that China was unwilling to take action against intellectual property
pirates, the U.S. imposed $1.08 billion in sanctions and the Chinese responded with
sanctions of their own. Chinese officials perceived continued U.S. pressure as an
unwarranted affront toward all recent Chinese efforts at transfomting the domestic legal
system to coincide with Western standards. 189 At the last minute, a trade war was averted
when Chinese and American officials reached an agreement that included an Action Plan
for the Effective Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. Under the Action Plan,
China agreed to the following: "to provide U.S. right holders with enhanced access to the
Chinese market; establish a system at the central, provincial and local levels to provide
strong, transparent and responsive enforcement of intellectual property rights; initiate a
special enforcement period during which enhanced resources will be allocated to the
enforcement of intellectual property rights; establish an effective border enforcement
regime; and ensure transparency of its legal regime, including the publication of all laws
and regulations concerning intellectual property protection."I90 As a result of China's
commitment to the aforementioned terms, the USTR revoked China's designation as a
priority foreign country and eliminated the sanctions. J9J The 1995 Enforcement
Agreement differed from previous pacts in that it focused entirely upon strengthening
China's existing laws instead of trying to implement new ones. 192
Continued dissatisfaction with China's enforcement efforts led the United States
to place China back on the Priority Watch List in 1996. Task forces that were supposed
to take action at addressing

IPR abuses in twenty-two provinces were never created.
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Pirate compact disc factories that were shut down during a brief enforcement period
reopened at the end of the crackdown. American software companies claimed that
twenty-eight of the twenty-nine pirate CD factories were still maintaining operations. In
addition, customs regulations were woefully ineffective. 193 U.S. officials engaged in a
series of talks with the Chinese government. In all. over forty negotiating sessions were
held between representatives from the two countries. 194 Under mounting U.S. pressure in
the form of $2 billion in threatened trade sanctions, China signed the 1996 Agreement on
the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. 195 During the negotiating session a team of
U.S. government officials was sent to China to verify the enforcement efforts undertaken
by the Chinese government. 196 The increased transparency resulting from bilateral
monitoring helped assuage U.S. fears of Chinese foot-dragging. Despite the initial
findings of the USTR which stated that China was unwilling to implement IPR reform,
U.S. officials monitoring Chinese efforts discovered that a lack of coordination and
widespread conuption provided a better explanation as to why IPR reform was occurring
at such a "slow" pace. In fact, evidence suggests that the central Chinese government
had recognized the importance of stronger intellectual property laws as a means to
enhance China's development efforts, but was having difficulty enforcing the new
mandates because of a lack of control over regional and local govemments. l97 The
difficulty in U.S.-China relations stemmed from misperceptions of relative power and
control: the Office of the USTR mistakenly perceived the Chinese state to have much
more control over the mechanisms of administrative enforcement than it actually
possessed. The decentralized nature of the Chinese state, made enforcement of new IPR
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standards difficult as a result of problems that were endemic to the bureaucratic system of
government.
To fulfill its commitment to the Agreement, Chinese authorities instigated a series
of campaigns against intellectual property pirates that resulted in the closure of thirtynine factories making illegal CDs, 250 arrests, and the confiscation of l.9 million illegal
compact disks. Forty illegal VCD production lines in Guangdong Province were also
closed.1 98 China's government has also instituted a reward system that pays up to
$36,000 for information leading to the seizure of CD lines. l99 Despite all of China's
efforts in bringing its domestic IPR system up to international standards, piracy continues
to be a major point of contention in U.S.-China trade relations. China continues to make

periodic raids on pirate factories and arrests continue on a regular basis. 2OO The Criminal
Law, which criminalizes copyright infringement, was enacted in 1997, yet intellectual
property piracy persists at an annual cost of billions of dollars to U.S. high tech
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To gain a better understanding of why intellectual property enforcement is so
di fficult in the People's Republic of China requires a look at the state apparatus itself.

The realm of governmental authority and structure is typically recognized as one of the
most sacred institutions of non-interference in interstate relations. The fact that bOlh the

1995 and 1996 IP Agreements between the U.S. and China narrowly avoided an all-out
trade war necessarily raises the question of how the U.S. can expect to strike a balance in
its trade policy toward China without completely destroying the conditions necessary for
constructive engagement.
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TRADE SANCTIONS: ELIMINATING THE SHORT-TERM
GAINS ASSOCIATED WITH SOFTWARE PIRACY
Similar to the case of BraziL in dealing with China, U.S. policy-makers were
faced with the challenge of convincing China that the long-tenn gains associated with the
fonnation and enforcement of an effective IPR system far outweighed the short-term
costs. Brazilian pharmaceutical manufacturers successfully competed with large, well
established multinational drug manufacturers in the Brazilian market through a strategy
of pirating drugs that were developed by foreign companies. By copying drugs, Brazilian
pharmaceutical companies did not have to invest hundreds of millions of dollars to
research and develop a new product. As a result, small, domestic producers effectively
eliminated the comparative advantage enjoyed by large, capital-rich phannaceutical
manufacturers with operations in developed nations. Similar conditions exist in the
Chinese computer software market that favor the existence of piracy over a more
legitimate approach to competition.

In the years after 1979, China struggled to modernize after decades of isolation
from the international market. Intellectual property rights hindered China's ability to
obtain and utilize the technological information necessary for economic growth. The
pirating of high tech goods enhanced the process of modernization through the
elimination of costs resulting from research and development. Lack of capital and
technical resources inhibited domestic enterprises from investing in costly development
effons relating to research and marketing. 202 The implementation of intellectual property
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rights in such an underdeveloped economy would drive domestic interests out of
business, thereby enabling foreign interests to capture a substantial share of the market.
The.displacement of domestic producers by foreign companies in the Brazilian
phannaceutical industry following the implementation of more stringent intellectual
propeny protection is a perfect example of the short-tean costs associated with IPR
reform in developing nations. Economic sanctions imposed by the United States
eliminate the shon-term benefits enjoyed by developing nations (such as Brazil and
China) that refuse to provide adequate enforcement of intellectual propeny rights. The
threat of costly sanctions proved a successful strategy in the case of Brazil, and it has met
with some success in the case of China in that the threat of trade sanctions has induced
the Chinese to make concessions on several occasions. Despite the initial efficacy of a
U.S. policy toward China that relies upon the threat of trade sanctions, intellectual
propeny rights violations by Chinese nationals continue to drain revenue from American
high tech industries. Unlike Brazil, China does not possess a democratic system of
government. The popular accountability of government officials does not exist to the
same extent in China as in BraziL As a result, unchecked corruption and "cronyism" in
the Chinese government represent significant impediments standing in the way of
effective IPR reform. The structure of the Chinese government itself represents the main
obstacle preventing continued intellectual property right reform in the fonn of stricter
enforcement mechanisms.
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ENFORCE1VlENT PROBLEMS UNDER A DECENTRALIZED
ADMlNISTRA TlVE GOVERN!YIENT
In China, central governmental authority is transferred to regional governments in
the way that local administrative bodies enforce state directives. The economic reform of
the 19805 enabled local governments in China to gain considerable control over their
administrative bodies, so that the separation of interests has in some instances become
blurred.

203

This phenomenon is especially evident in the area of intellectual property

rights. Recognizing the importance of administrative government in enforcing
government policy, the United States worked to strengthen the administration of
intellectual property protection when formulating both the 1995 Accord and the 1996
Agreement with China. 204
A centerpiece of the 1995 Accord was the creation of the IPWC, a separate
administrative entity that would assist provincial, regional, and local governments in the
enforcement of intelleclUal property rights. The IPWC oversees the efforts of several
different agencies, all of which have some involvement in the protection of intellectual
property rights. These agencies include the AIC, the Patent Office, and the Public
Security Bureau. The 1996 act improved upon these changes by increasing the
responsibility allotted to the centralized Ministry of Public Security (MPS). As a result
of these changes, the MPS possessed the authority to include piracy as a target in its
national anti-crime campaign. By enlisting the fonnidable resources and manpower of
the MPS, efforts to combat intellectual property right violations were elevated to a new
level. 205
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Despite much needed changes in the organizational structure of the enforcement
apparalUs of its government, poor IPR enforcement continues to plague China's state
officials. The special system of courts that the Chinese government established expressly
to deal with intellectual property rights disputes are plagued by inexperienced judges
who, because of their low salaries. are easily bribed by copyright pirates. Between 1957
and 1965. the once independent judiciary was integrated into the Communist Party. A
completely independent judiciary has been slow in the making despite numerous
reforms. 206 Although some agencies have been made autonomous, local and regional
officials are often reluctant to take action against powerful government officials who
might be implicated in the violation of intellectual property rights. The Chinese Trade
Minister has stated that one illegal factory in particular is "untouchable" because of the
owner's close ties to the military.201 According to the Business Software Alliance, illegal
software is often used by government agencies. 208 Local governments that occupy a
position ofrelative autonomy from Beijing often invest heavily in illegal software
production. 209 According to a 1996 article in the Electronic Engineering Times, in
Shenzhen, China, " ...CDs are openly displayed in nearly every shop, despite the presence
of armed soldiers and police... business is brisk.,,2Io Despite the existence of enforcement
mechanisms. piracy continues unabated as a result of crooked governmental interference.
The Chinese government's efforts to promote development have reached a
crossroads of sorts: either officials can continue to turn a blind eye to rampant intellectual
propeI1Y rights violations, or China must restructure its adminisuati ve apparatus so as to
eradicate the conditions that presently perpetuate piracy. The former course of action
will only serve to fUI1her alienate China from the international marker to which it so
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desperately desires membership. Legitimacy comes with World Trade Organization
(WTO) membership. Change must occur from the top down, as local and regional
authorities are often themselves the source of copyright violations. The lure of quick
profits coupled with little or no threat of prosecution from Beijing, represent strong
incentives favoring persistent localized corruption.
China's economy has developed to a considerable extent since 1979. Technology
crucial to development that was once inaccessible is now no longer so. To be sure, China
is far from attaining developed country status, but is has also moved a long way from its
underdeveloped, isolated position that it occupied only two decades ago. In order to
continue to develop, China needs access to new technology. Although China's reliance
on new technology has slackened, it nevertheless remains a crucial component in any
development equation. The United States represents one of only a handful of nation that
possess the technological research and development capabilities that China covets. The
United States also represents China's most important market for exports. 211 Through
U.S. investment China can continue to develop its economy at an increasing rate. Piracy
of intellectual property discourages U.S. investment, especially by small and mid-size
firms who cannot afford substantial losses that result from piracy. The United States also
holds the key to China's entry into the WTO. In short, China cannot afford to alienate
itself from the United States. In addition, the United States needs access to China's vast
market in order to promote exports. China's market also boasts considerable potential for
expansion. Indeed, the U.S. can ill afford to push China beyond arms length. In
formulating a coherent intellectual property right policy vis a vis China, the United States
must take into account several factors that could potentially derail constructive relations.
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One of the most imponant considerations is perception. The United State must refrain
from becoming overly impatient with the reform process. Many of the remaining
impediments to IPR implementation are structural, and cannot be easily modified.
Moreover, many of the necessary alterations rest firmly in the protected realm of st.ate
sovereignty. The history of Western imperialism in Asia is still fresh in the minds of the
Chinese. In addition. American foreign policy practitioners must be mindful of cultural
differences and take action accordingly. The re-education of 1 billion people does not
occur overnight. Although the U.S. approach adopted in the case of Brazil met with
success in that country, a similar approach toward China has produced what can only be
described as mediocre results: IPR laws and related enforcement mechanisms are roughly
in place. yet piracy continues unabated. The policy considerations briefly highlighted
above necessarily raise the question whether the present U.S. IPR policy toward China is
the best possible course of action in years to come. In the concluding section, I hope to
answer that question with policy recommendations of my own.

V. CONCLUSION
In a world where the dissemination of information and ideas occurs on an
unprecedented scale, the protection of the knowledge responsible for the production of
high-tech goods and services poses a difficult set of challenges to United States foreign
policy practitioners. The erosion of the power of states to exercise control over the flow
of capital and information makes the institutionalization of a uniform system of
protection for intellectual property a crucial objective for U.S. officials seeking to sustain
American preeminence in international markets. A second consideration also threatens
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America's present position of global dominance in high tech goods and services: as the
high-tech competitiveness of the United States declines relative to other nations, the
power of the United States to influence the behavior of other nations will decline as well.
The recognition of a condition of deteriorating economic power relative to other nations
necessarily induces state officials to become more sensitive to concerns of relative gains.

In the case of the United States, implicit in the drive to establish an international system
of intellectual property right protection is the recognition of declining American
dominance in certain high-tech sectors. During the mid to late 1980s, the effective end of
the Cold War combined with rising Japanese economic strength caused U.S. trade
officials to re-evaluate American trade policy. During the Cold War. U.S. trade policy
called for the subordination of U.S. economic interests in favor of strategic military
concerns, in effect a policy of reverse discrimination. The dissolution of the Soviet threat
shifted the focus of U.S. foreign policy officials to the deteriorating balance of trade with
Japan. The phrase "Buy American" quickly replaced "Better Dead than Red." By the
end of !.he Cold War, economic concerns had attained an elevated degree of imp0rlance
in the realm of interstate relations.
High tech industries dependent on intellectual property protection experienced the
highest level of growth during the 19805. In the 1990s. high tech industries accounted for
an even greater percentage of U.S. economic growth. Perhaps most significantly, these
same industries possess the greatest potential for future expansion when compared to
other sectors of the American economy.
Ahhough sectors that produce high tech goods and services stand to reap
enonnous profits in the future, this favorable position is made precarious by high tech
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industries' reliance on the protection of intellectual property. In order to bring
technologically innovative products to market. companies must invest hundreds of
millions of dollars into research and development. As an incentive to encourage
continued innovation on the part of private enterprises. most developed nations have
instituted systems of intellecrual property protection that guarantee the inventor of a
particular product all profits that may result from the sale of that product for a fixed
number of years. Piracy of intellectual property in foreign markets represents the greatest
aggregate threat to continued growth in American high tech industries. Developing
nations, where piracy as a percentage of the total market is very high, are perceived of as
threatS to important U.S. economic interests (i.e. the promotion of U.S. high tech goods
and services in foreign markets). Both Brazil and China represent large developing
nations with weak intellectual property rights systems that have been targeted in the past
by U.S. foreign policy officials for aggressive IPR reform. As was the case in both Brazil
and China, most developing nations are faced with numerous economic disincentives to
institute stringent intellectual property right systems. Intellectual property right reform in
developing nations often results in short-term economic dislocation. Domestic producers,
unable to compete with capital-rich multinational corporations, are forced out of business
under stricter IPR regulations. Established multinational companies that enjoy a
comparative advantage in industries requiring substantial investments in research and
development stand to gain the most from intellectual property right reform in developing
nations. U.S. foreign policy practitioners were faced with the challenge of creating a
policy that would make piracy more cos[ly than [he process of intellectual property right
reform. Faced with a rapidly changing intemational economic environment, U.S. foreign
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policy practitioners endeavored to secure vital U.S. business interests abroad. As U.S.
hegemony declines, American trade officials are able to exeI1 less influence over trading
partners, therefore, practitioners cognizant of the impending constraints imposed by a
condition of hegemonic decline sought to implement a plan that could be enacted quickly
and effectively. The result was a comprehensive, two-part strategy developed to secure
American economic dominance in high-tech markets.
The creation of TRIPS represents one of two facets of U.S. IPR policy. The other
component is the threat of unilateral trade sanctions to be used against nations unwilling
to accede to the universal noons stipulated in the TRIPS agreement. Two competing
theories of international relations, realism and post-hegemonic stability theory, when
integrated, provide a strong explanation as to why the United States worked to establish
an international intellectual property rights regime such as TRIPS. The effective
enforcement of intellectual property right norms established in the TRIPS agreement,
however, has proven difficult in developing nations. The case of China is a perfect
example. Each developing country is faced with varying political systems and diverse
cultural heritages that inhibit a seamless integration of Western law with non-Western
societies and non-Western political structures. The fashioning of an effective policy
designed to address enforcement problems in developing nations is not possible using the
prescriptive framework of traditional realism. Post-Hegemonic Stability Theory is also
inadequate in providing an appropriate policy framework. Certain considerations,
consistent with liberalism. preclude a policy based on the proverbial "black box." To
solve the problem of weak enforcement of international intellectual property right norms,
the "black-box" must be opened.
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Consistent with liberalism, post hegemonic stability theory recognizes that a
combination of related events and actions can build to establish certain predictable
relationships that facilitate cooperation. Post hegemonic stability theory departs from
conventional IiberaJism in its recognition of coercive means and exploitation of discord
among nations as salient factors leading to cooperation. The latter hypothesis of PHST is
consistent with a realist conception of international relations. Like realism, PHST posits
that international relations are defined by a state of anarchy. According to realists, this
condition of anarchy makes cooperation very difficult because it forces nations to
concern themselves with individual survival above all else. In an environment of distrust
and suspicion. states are not likely to join international arrangements that might work
against individual state interests in the future. The chances of an international
organization working to satisfy the interests of all states to an equal extent is highly
unlikely according to realists. States are imbued with different capabilities derived from
varying concentrations of natural resources. Different capabilities naturally render states
unequal in their relations with one another. The interests of a state that is rich in natural
wealth will differ from those of a nation that lacks basic natura] resources. Furthermore,
diverse cultures, ideologies. political systems, and social hierarchies also work to
distinguish states from one another. A plethora of interstate differences undermine the
prospects for cooperation in an anarchic world.
Unlike realism, post-hegemonic stability theory contends that cooperation can
occur as a direct result of conflict between states. Realists aver that conflict is a likely
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occurrence between states. PHST embraces this assumption and then explains why
inherently contentious conditions actually foster accord.
An international environment defined by a declining hegemonic state marks the
core assumption of post-hegemonic stability theory. As the ability of a hegemonic Slate
to shape the international environment deteriorates, the potential for conflict increases.
Without the political influence to induce other nations to behave in a certain manner, the
international arena grows less centralized around a singular core. Other nations will grow
more inclined to test the resolve of the declining hegemonic state, thereby resulting in
increased conflict over several issue areas.
In the case of the United States, once policy-makers recognized a condition of
relative hegemonic decline, efforts were made to secure U.S. dominance in a crucial
sector of the international economy: high-tech goods and services. Rampant intellecLUal
property piracy presented the greatest threat to continued U.S. preeminence in high-tech
trade. American trade officials identified the potential for increased conflict and
subsequently constructed a comprehensive cooperative plan with international scope that
would serve to minimize future disagreements. The creation of a uni versal intellectual
property rights regime mirroring the high standards upheld in the United States
effectively placed the burden of reform on developing nations with lax IPR systems. If
developing nations did not take significant steps to restructure inadequate intellectual
property right systems, the United States would impose crippling economic sanctions. If
the United States truly believed in the efficacy of absolute gains, perhaps the United
States would have provided positive inducements in the form of trade preferences or
financial assistance to help ease the burden of reform. Furthermore, the value of
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intellectual property piracy is highest in the United States in certain key sectors (software
for example). This statistic is easily masked by the fact that piracy accounts for only a
small percentage of the total U.S. market. If the United States were truly concerned
about absolute gains. the greatest efforts would be applied to improving enforcement at
home. Instead, U.S. foreign policy officials are quick to praise the flawed American
system of intellectual property right protection. The entire TRIPS Agreement contains
standards that are borrowed directly from the U.S. system. This standard of protection
was not chosen because it afforded the highest degree of protection, but because it
granted U.S. business interests a considerable comparative advantage. U.S. businesses
did not have to make costly changes as a result of the establishment of a "new"
international benchmark of intellectual property protection. Companies based in foreign
countries are faced with two likely scenarios as a result of the implementation of TRIPS:
either foreign companies will be forced out of business in their respective home markets,
or the companies will be forced to restructure so that more capit.a..l is invested in research
and development. In either case, U.S. finns stand to gain a considerable share of foreign
markets as a result of the TRIPS Agreement. Relative gains provide a sound explanation
as to why the United States worked to establish an international intellectual property
rights regime.
The case of the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry provides further evidence in
support of relative-gains concerns as the impetus behind U.S. behavior. Domestic
phannaceutical manufacturers in Brazil engaged in piracy in order to "beat" the
comparative advantage enjoyed by large multinational pharmaceutical companies that
could afford to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in researching and developing
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drugs. Once the Brazilian government was coerced into instituting intellectual property
right reform, some domestic producers were forced out of business and others had to
contend with the high costs involved in restructuring operations. Prior to the
implementation of TRIPS, a trade deficit had developed between the United St2tes and
Brazil where the United States was imponing far more goods and services than it was
exporting to Brazil. After the institutionalization of TRIPS, the trade deficit turned into a
substantial trade surplus nearly ovemight. 2l2 Although a marked increase in the
consumption of U.S. goods and services in Brazil cannot be attributed solely to the
acceptance of TRIPS standards, an increase in intellectual property right protection
undoubtedly contributed to this phenomenon.
The creation of an international regime mirroring U.S. laws obviously served the
primary interests of one state alone: the United States. According to post-hegemonic
stability theory, regimes are established and subsequently shaped by their most powerful
members, often through coercion and threat. U.S. foreign policy practitioners anticipated
non-eompliance on the part of developing nations, otherwise they would not have made
provisions for the use of trade sanctions as a secondary measure. In order to speed up the
implementation process, U.S. trade officials advocated the threat of unilateral trade
sanctions as a means by which recalcitrant nations could be coerced into cooperating with
U.S. demands. Through coercion and threat manifest in the form of trade sanctions, the
United States altered the behavior of states by aggressively redefining their preferences.
A final question raised by the formation of TRIPS relates to the behavior of
America's major trading partners: why did the major trading partners of the U.S. offer
little opposition to the creation ofTRlPS? Again, post-hegemonic stability theory offers
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a compelling explanation. PHST distinguishes between harmony (a confluence of
interests) and cooperation. Cooperation results from the alteration of behavior.
Hannony. on the other hand, does not require a reevaluation of preferences. According
to PHST, U.S. intellectual property right policy resulted in a harmony of interests among
the Great Powers. Faced with the prospect of few changes as a result of accepting the
norms established by TRIPS, major trading partners of the U.S. such as Japan and the ED
decided to refrain from sabotaging U.S. efforts. Increased market share far outweighed
the cost of minor adjustments to domestic intellectual property systems for developed
nations. With lillie to lose and much to gain by the formation ofTRJPS, the EU and
Japan did not anempt to thwart U.S. efforts to raise the bar of international intellectual
property protection.
The case of Brazil played an instrumental role in U.S. efforts to establish TRIPS.
Brazilian opposition to U.S. pressure afforded the United States an ample opportunity to
demonstrate to the world the magnitude of its resolve. Brazilian foot-dragging coincided
with the on-going debate at the Uruguay Round of GAIT over the efficacy of an
international intellectual property rights regime. By threatening unilateral tnlde sanctions
against Brazil if Brazil refused to acquiesce to American demands, the United States
emphasized the importance of intellectual property to U.S. interests. Brazil was used as
an international example of what would happen if states did not voluntarily accede to the
standards embedded in TRIPS. Rather than face trade sanctions, a plurality of states
agreed co TRIPS at the Uruguay Round. An aggressive unilateral policy stance by the
U.S. proved successful in the case of Brazil. A similar approach was used against China
during the same time period, resulting in equivalent success: China reformed its domestic
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IPR system to agree with international standards. Unlike Brazil, China is still plagued by
problems of IPR enforcement. Disparities between Brazil and China call attention to the
need for a case by case approach in addressing enforcement problems. The two-part U.S.
strategy of international regime formation coupled with unilateral action is ineffective in
dealing with problems arising from within the political and social structure of states.

WHAT DOES THE RITURE HOLD FOR u.s. IPR POLICY?
When combined. realism and post-hegemonic stability theory go a long way in
explaining state behavior contributing to the formation of TRIPS. Both theories inform
the analysis of the final structure of TRIPS, and the Agreement's shortcomings; however.
both realism and PHST do nOt provide an adequate prescriptive framework for future
U.S. intellectual property policy. One of the central challenges to U.S. policy-makers
over the next several years wi II be to address widespread piracy in foreign markets
resulting from inadequate enforcement. The myriad problems associated with
enforcement in developing nations are easily recognized when viewed in the context of
China.
Given the apparent success of trade sanctions as a policy tool used to initiate
reform, it stands to reason that perhaps continued threats of trade sanctions might induce
nations to provide more effective levels of IPR enforcement. The repeated threat of
sanctions was successful in bringing China to the negotiating table. When faced with
loss of access to the U.S. market for selected goods, China relented to U.S. pressure year
after year during the early to mid-1990s. By 1997. China had developed a sophisticated
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IPR system commensurate with standards of Western law embodied in the TRIPS
Agreement. The threat of trade sanctions, although effective when used sparingly to
force state officials to reform that which they can control, are not effective when
government officials are constrained from producing the desired outcome. In other
words, when Slate officials are faced with either political or structural constraints
endemic to a particular nation's system of government, compliance with the demands of a
foreign nation is not always feasible.
In the case of China, evidence supports the observation that central government

officials recognize the importance of a strong intellectual property rights system for
future economic growth and development. Chinese officials quickly accorrunodated U.S.
demands calling for intellectual property reform. In only fifteen years. China completely
integrated Western legal concepts into its system of law. Chinese officials want very
much to be afforded the respect of a legitimate world power. World power status comes
with designation as a developed nation with a robust economy. The next step in China's
ascendance to higher international status is admission to the World Trade Organization.
The United States currently holds the key to China's acceptance. U.S. trade officials
presently admonish China for allowing the existence of extraordinarily high levels of
piracy in several sectors of the Chinese market. Consistent criticism by the U.S. is an
embarrassment for China's leadership. The aforementioned considerations underscore
the fact that China's leadership has indubitably recognized that a strong intellectual
property right system is in the best interest of the Chinese government.
An aggressive unilateral trade policy vis a vis China will only serve to exacerbate
tensions between the United States and China. As mentioned earlier, the threat of trade
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sanctions is most effective when used with reservation. The threat of trade sanctions
generally implies that a particular country is willing to risk a trade war in order to achieve
its goals. A trade war is a serious consequence with high costs incurred by both parties
involved in the dispute. China's trade officials might start to doubt the willingness of the
U.S. to follow through on its threats jf relied upon repeatedly as a method of coercion.
Moreover, aggressive U.S. behavior will only serve to frustrate and potentially alienate
Chinese officials. If China's officials have indeed recognized that a strong intellectual
property rights system is in China's best interest, then consistent bullying will make a
policy of constructive engagement that much more difficult to pursue.
Given the apparent failure of trade sanctions as a viable policy tool, what options,
if any, are presented by the TRIPS Agreement that might promote increased enforcement
in China without straining relations? China has unofficially acceded to most of the major
tenets of the TRIPS Agreement, however, technically, China is not a signatory to the
TRIPS regime. Like most international conventions and agreements, the TRIPS
Agreement is extremely weak in dealing with issues of enforcement. According to
international law, respect for state sovereignty precludes the establishment of an
international mechanism of enforcement in the case of TRIPS. If a state decides to
breach the Agreement, there is very little multilateral action that can be taken aside from
the issuance of a general statement condemning the action. Legitimate unilateral action
can be taken under the TRIPS Agreement, but only after bilateral negotiations have
broken down. The first step in settling an intellectual property right dispute under TRIPS
is partiCipation by both parties in the dispute resolulion mechanism of GAIT. The
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problem with this course of action in relations with China is that China is not a member
of the WTO, nor is it a signatory to TRIPS.
If the United States were to grant China membership to the WTO, China would

automatically become a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement as well. In this case, the
United States would be able to negotiate with China under the more legitimate auspices
of the GAIT. Should bilateral negotiations break down. the United States would be able
to impose unilateral trade sanctions on China as a last resort if and only if the GAIT
review board determines that China did indeed violate some norm of international trade.
Under the rules of the GATT, however. U.S. sanctions would be limited to goods that are
directly in dispute. Once China becomes a member of the WTO the U.S. will be unable
to threaten unilateral sanctions without first attempting negotiation through some son of
multilateral body. International mediation is often a lengthy, drawn-out process. China
might be able to prolong any action on its pan by stalling in the negotiation process. The
United States is restrained from acting unilaterally during GAIT negotiations. Currently,
the U.S. may threaten to impose sanctions on China whenever it sees fit. Under the status
quo, the United States enjoys more freedom of choice in selecting an appropriate policy.
In addition, the current situation affords the U.S. greater leverage in negotiations in that

China has not been admitted to the WTO. The U.S. can use WTO membership as an
incentive to coerce China into behaving a certain way. Once China is admitted to the
WTO, U.S. leverage in trade disputes with China will decline.
Even though China's government officials may have recognized that strong
intellectual property right protection is an imperative component in its development
strategy, the effective enforcement of Western notions of intellectual property still
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presents an enormous challenge. Several factors, both internal and external, have
combined to affect China's ability to provide an acceptable level of property right
enforcement. The endogenous variables are unique to most developing nations, whereas
the exogenous variables have affected states occupying multiple levels of development.
Both TRIPS and unilateral U.S. efforts managed to redefine China's preferences
so that China effectively acceded to international IPR norms. Problems arose when these
same traditional policies formed the basis of an initiative directed at lax enforcement in
China. Inefficiencies within China's system of administrative government proves that
Slate behavior is not always defined by state preferences. The preferences of state
officials do not always translate into state action, This realization highlights a deficiency
within the system of interstate relations. Under the present system, most states operate
under the assumption lhat state behavior is a direct result of preferences put into action.
When China fails to enforce intellectual property right norms, U.S. foreign policy
practitioners perceive Chinese inaction as deriving from official state policy. In reality,
official state policy calls for enforcement, yet local officials either consciously decide not
to enforce state directives or are simply incapable of carrying out assignments due to a
lack of resources. In this case, the central Slate apparatus is unable

10

exercise control

over regional and local agencies responsible for enforcement. All legal and executive
mechanisms are in place, yet enforcement still does not occur. The United States has
repeatedly threatened to impose punitive sanctions on a central government that is
struggling within its own limited capabilities

10

appease foreign concerns. What is

needed is not increased external pressure, but internal reform that addresses the source of
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the problem. In the case of China, the source of inefficiency is the confused coexistence
of a liberalized market economy with the remnants of a decentralized socialist state.
Corruption is widespread in developing nations. From the highest government
offices on down to local administrative officials, corruption knows no bounds. In the
case of China. mi litary officers and high-ranking government officials often have
investments tied up in the pirate factories that are targeted for closure. Lower-ranking
government officials are often reluctant to blow the whistle on their superiors for fear of
retribution. During the liberalization of China's economy during the 19805. local
government officials wrested from Beijing considerable authority relating to the oversight
of local production. As a result, the line between the private and public sectors became
blurred. Government officials responsible for enforcing the laws would conveniently fail
to take action whenever personal investments were jeopardized.
Corruption often results from rapid economic liberalization that occurs too
quickly for state regulation to keep pace. From rapid liberalization spring economic
dislocation and exploitation by public officials. The negative effects of internal
corruption are funher exacerbated by rapid external changes collectively referred

to

as

globalization. At dizzying speeds. capital and infolIDation can be transferred around the
globe. The increase in technological innovation has outpaced the development of
associated governmental regulation. States find themselves in increasingly vulnerable
positions, unable to control vital resources. Once the process of market liberalization
begins. rarely is a state able to fully prepare for the problems that might arise. As the
liberalization process speeds up. old social structures can be turned upside down.
Conditions of instability are a central concern for government officials overseeing the
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liberalization of a developing economy. Realism does not account for the effect that
internal factors rrught have on the ability of a nation to carry out policy. Strains of liberal
thought, such as embedded liberalism, assume that the state can exercise considerable
control over domestic concerns ranging from economic liberalization to legal reform.
Both theories appear outdated in a contemporary world characterized by dynamic
evolution. Technology is the catalyst behind modern day change. The state that controls
the catalyst controls the future shape of the international environment.
Given the limitations of traditional theories of international relations in addressing
the problem of eroding state power, what options remain for foreign policy practitioners?

In regard to China, the best possible solutions involve collaborative efforts between
public and private actors. The proven impotency of the Chinese government in
combating piracy means that an incenlive for legitimate action must come from a
different source. Joint ventures between software manufacturers and pirates represent a
win-win situation for all involved. Pirates no longer have to fear the law (as if they ever
did in the first place), and they still retain the right to distribute software. Initially, pirates
will most likely face a loss in revenue, but that's the price of security. Instead of
operating in fear of a future government crack-down, fonner pirates are transformed into
capitalists. free to pursue profits for as long as possible. As a result of joint ventures,
consumers are guaranteed quality goods, and the software manufacturers actually turn a
profit.
In China, intellectual property is still a relatively foreign concept. What is needed
is a comprehensive educationaJ campaign. The public destruction of millions of pirated
CDs by government-owned steamrollers is a start, but hardly worthy of being called a
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media blitz. A relatively novel idea was attempted in Beijing where a half-hour sitcom
designed to entertain and educate citizens about the computer world was aired for 26
episodes. Microsoft and Compaq underwrote the costs ($475,000) for producing the first
series. More than 700,000 viewers saw the first episode when it was aired in Beijing
("Sitcom Plugs PCs on Beijing Television," South China Morning Post, February 14,
1996). More public-private initiati yes are needed in this area.
A more long-term solution

to

China's enforcement problems is an increase in the

involvement of U.S. delegations of legal specialists and government experts in refonning
China's administrative system of intellectual property oversight. Judges within the
Chinese judicial system are paid low salaries, making them susceptible to bribes and
threats. U.S. officials who witness the inadequacies of the Chinese system first-hand will
gain a greater appreciation of the challenges facing China's government officials. U.S.
foreign policy practitioners will be able to temper American foreign policy accordingly.
Liberalism posits that the emergence of epistemic communities between nations will
foster greater understanding, thereby reducing the potential for conflict. The services of
legal and political experts will be received much more favorably than a procession of
trade officials brandishing threats of sanctions.
The cure to the problems plaguing contemporary U.S. IPR policy is not difficult
to recognize, however, it is a difficult pill to swallow. The answer requires a non
traditional approach to international relations involving intrastate variables. The present
predicament facing American IPR policy reminds me of a simple scenario observed years
ago. As a child, I used to watch my cat play inside of a cardboard box.. When standing
away from the box, from one moment to the next, I could never predict in which direction
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the box would move. When I peered over the edge of the box. I could view the actions of
my cat and predict the effect those actions would have on the box's walls. Throwing
veiled threats at the outside of the proverbial black box will only push the box farther and
farther away. making constructive dialogue impossible. An understanding of the
workings of the inside of the box is fundamental to a correct interpretation of its
movements. Only when U.S. foreign policy practitioners learn to look within the
workings of the Chinese government and adapt American IPR policy accordingly, will
positive change occur.
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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES-BRAZIL TRADE DATA: EXPORTS, IMPORTS,
AND MERCHANDISE TRADE: 1980-1998
UNITED STATES' EXPORTS TO BRAZIL, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1980
4,343
3,423
3,140
3.798
2,557
2,640
3,665
1989
4,804

1990
5,048

1991
6,148

1992
5,751

1993
6,045

UNITED STATES' GENERAL IMPORTS FROM BRAZIL
1982
1983
1984
1980
1981
3,715
4,475
4,285
4,946
7,620
1989
8,410

1990
7,698

1991
6,717

1992
7.609

1993
7,466

1994
8,101.60

1990
-2,850

1991
-569

1992
-1,858

1993
-1.421

1988
4,289

1995
1996
1997
1998
11.439.40 12,717.50 15,914.70 15,157.00

1985
7,526

1986
6,813

1987
7,665

1988
9,324

1994
8,682,60

1995
8,832,90

1996
6,773.40

1997
9,625.50

1987
-3,825

1988
-5035

1996
3,944,20

1997
6,289.20

UNITED STATES' MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCE WITH BRAZIL
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
-6n
-862
-2,389
-4,981
-4,386
-2,928
626
1989
-3,606

1987
4.040

1994
-561

1995
2,606.60

1998
10,122.50

1998
5,034.50

Aliliguras In millions 01 dollars
SOURCE: "U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services,' Statistical Abstract of the United Stales, U.S.
Bureau 01 the Census, Washington, D.C. (1 05th, 109th, 11 Oth, 115th, and 1191h Edillons),1965, 1969, 1990, 1994, 1999.

APPENDIXB

UNITED STATES--CHINA TRADE DATA: EXPORTS, IMPORTS,
AND MERCHANDISE TRADE: 1980-1998
UNITED STATES' EXPORTS TO CHINA, DOMESTIC, AND FOREIGN
1982
1984
1985
1980
1981
1983
1986
4,337
4,305
4,367
4,700
5,524
5,003
4,667
1989'
5,755

1990
4.806

1991
6,278

1992
7,418

1993
8,767

UNITED STATES' GENERAL IMPORTS FROM CHINA
1981
1982
1980
1983
1984
6,854
8,049
11,204
14,768
8,693
1989"
11,990

1990
15,237

1991
18,969

1992
25,728

1993
31,535

1994
9,282

1995
11,754

1996
11,992.60

1985
16,396

1986
19,791

1987
24,622

1990
-10,431

1991
-12.691

1992
-18,309

1993
-22,768

1988
12,130
1997
1998
12,862.30 14.258.00

1988
24,804

1994
1995
1996
1997
38,786.70 45,543.20 51,512.60 62,557.60

UNITED STATES' MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCE WITH CHINA
1985
1980
1981
1982
1986
1983
1984
-2,517
-4,526
-3,744
-6,537
-9,765
-11,696
·14,267
1989"
-6,235

1987
7,413

1987
-17,209

1998
71,155.90

1988
-12,674

1994
1998
1995
1996
1997
-29,504.90 -33,789.60 -39,520.00 -49,695.30 -56,897.90

• All dala prior to 1989 includes combined trade figures for Taiwan and mainland China; all data following 1988 is
lor mainland China alone
AU ligures In millions of dollars
SOURCE: ·U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services: Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S.
Bureau oltha Census, Washington, D.C. (1 05th, 109th, 110th, 115th, and 119th Editions),198S, 1989. 1990, 1994, 1999.

APPENDIXC

REALISM
I) Nations are sensitive to changes in relative power
2) Nation-slates exist in an anarchical environment that perpetuates
a pervasive condition of fear and distrust.
3) Anarchy is defined by realists as an ordering principle
recognizing independent, sovereign states as the primary actors
in the intemational arena; there is no higher aUlhority above the
nalion-state.
4) With the ever-presenl possibility to war looming in the
background, relations between nations are defined by constant
security competition. Atlhe extreme, nations worry that they
will be either conquered or destroyed by more powerful slates.
In a more moderate sense, nations are fearful that a decrease in
their power or an increase in another state's power relative to
theirs will enable other countries to take advantage of their
weakened political position.
5) A particular nation will take action in order lo remedy changes in
the distribution of power that serve to disadvantage the
capabi lilies of that nation.
6) States can never be certain of the intentions of other states
7) In a world of perfect information. state behavior is impossible to
predict beyond a shadow of a doubt.
8) Calculated survival strategies enable states to generally act in a
rational manner; however. misperceived intentions can result in
irrational actions, thereby exacerbating the pervasive condition
of fear and distrust in international relations.
9) Since states cannot rely upon one another for security. alliances
may form, but they only represent temporary arrangements.
According to realists, cooperation can and does occur despite
numerous disincentives for collective arrangements. In order to
succeed, cooperative endeavors must adequately address both
relative-gains considerations and concerns about cheating.

10) Realists contend that states are concerned with both absolute
gains and relative gains. Due to balance of power
considerations. states are primarily motivated by relative gains.
In an anarchic intemational environment, Slates are concerned
with at least maintaining the status quo relative to another state
when entering into an agreement. A related concern of states is
that one or more states will defect from a cooperative
arrangement. thereby gaining a relative advantage. This
phenomenon is known as "cheating" in international relalions
parlance. To realists. institutions are manifestations of national
self-interest hnsed on the international distribution of power.
The most powerful states create institutions to promote national
concerns. Cooperation and institution building are possible in a
realist world, but only if they coincide with individual state
interests.
Implicalions for TRIPS
According to a realist conception of international relations. the United
States worked to eSlablish TRIPS after realizing that Ihe U.S. was declining
in economic strength relative to other nations. Trade losses were quite
pronounced in the high tech sector of the American economy. Given the
importance of technology deri ved from high tech industry to fUlure U.S.
economic and military security. U.S. foreign policy practitioners
endeavored to eSUlblish a strong international intellectual property right
system to protecl U.S. inlellectual property in foreign markets. American
trade officials were faced wilh Ihe task of securing the Uniled States' high
tech complHalive advanlage abroud. TRIPS was modeled on America's
domestic intellectual property syslem; therefore. U.S. firms did not have to
incur the high costs associated with altering business practices to conform
to a new standard of protection. The TRIPS agreement was created to
promOle U.S. business interests in foreign markets at a significanl cost to
foreign producers.

NEOLIBERALISM
I) Neoliberalism agrees with the fundamental assumption of
realism that nations exist in an anarchic environment; however,
neoliberalism posits that realism severely underestimates the
likelihood of cooperation in such an environment.
2) Government decisions are often the product of politically
mediated coalition bargaining.
3) Cognition and perception define state interaction.
4) Neoliberalism contends that through an iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma, defections can be punished and coordinated
conventions can develop. More specifically, an effort to respond
to present cooperation with cooperation in the future and a threat
to meet present defection with future defection can effectively
improve the potential for cooperation. In order to achieve this
objective of increased cooperation, actors' motives must be
relatively transparent. thereby resulting in an increased level of
information sharing.
5) International institutions facilitate the emergence of cooperation.
By providing information, institutions can work to assuage fears
of unequal distribution of gains.
6) Institutions ensure that gains are evenly distributed over time.
Distributional issues, or relative-gains concerns are essentially
the same thing as concerns dealing with iterated reciprocity-a
central focus ofneoliberaltheory. Neoliberals contend that
solution to both dilemmas is the formation of institutions that
promote the sharing of more perfect information.
7) Regimes do not enforce rules in a hierarchical manner. Instead.
they reduce the level of uncertainty between nations by altering
the transaction costs and by providing beller information to the
panicipants.
8) Once a regime is established on a smaller scale. it can be
maintained and even expanded through patterned behavior and

legitimacy. Legitimacy leads to the condition that future payoffs
are valued more than current payoffs, making the incentive to
defect today less important since the other members will retaliate
tomorrow.
9) Regimes create issue-linkage that further induces slates to act
according to established rules instead of defecting in pursuit of
shon-term gains. States become reluctant to breach an
agreement for fear that retaliation can occur in several different
issue areas.
10) Once regimes are established. international norms and
procedures can serve to alter the decision-making process of
states, thereby inducing a greater willingness to cooperate due to
greater transparency. In essence, decision making becomes a
joint process.
Implications for TRIPS
According to neoliberalism, states are rational. "atomistic" actors that seek
to maximize individual absolute gains while remaimng indifferent to gains
achieved by others. Therefore. the United States worked to create TRIPS in
order to address problems associated with lax intellectual property right
protection in foreign markets that was hurting Ihe competitiveness of U.S.
companies. By eSLablishing a uni versa! standard of intellectual property to
be enforced through the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade
Organization, the United States sought to legitimize a system of norms thaI
would be voluntorily adopted by all nations. for the betterment of all
notions. Once having acceded to TRIPS. member-states would refrain form
breaching the Agreement in fear of retaliation by other members.

EMBEDDED LIBERALISM
I)

2)

3)
4)

5)

6)

7)

Embedded liberalism attempts to explain what factors help to
mitigate perceived threats to sovereignty that states evaluate
when deciding whether or not to participate in a particular
international institution.
Relative-gains considerations represent only one of numerous
factors that may work to inOuence stale behavior. Political
variables maner more than the traditional constraints on
collective action.
States are not simply unitary actors seeking to maximize their
individual welfare.
Embedded liberalism sees anarchy as a structure of socially
ordered states that define the system as easily as the system
works to define the nation-state.
The definition of anarchy is never static. Relative-gains
considerations only matter sometimes, if at all. Myriad factors
ranging from domestic politics to stale identity also affect the
decision-making process of states. Embedded liberalism calls
for states to pursue a policy of conlrolled liberalization in order
to help mitigate the effects of globalization.
According to embedded liberalism, equilibrium can be reached
between domestic and international stability. Federal
governmental institutions can coex.ist harmoniously with
international institutions resulling in improved cooperation and
general welfare maximization. Central to this hypothesis is
respect for slate sovereignty. In order to control the effects of
economic and political integration, individual states must retain a
certain degree of sovereign power. The mechanisms for control
must be normalized to the extent that they become "embedded"
in international relations.
Like conventional conslructivism, embedded liberalism
recognizes the importance of Ihe "power of practice" or iterated
action in promoting cooperation.

Implications ror TRIPS
Recognizing the disincentives for cooperation in the TRIPS regime
confronting developing nations. U.S. policy-makers worked to establish
TRIPS as an agreement designed with respect for state sovereignty.
Developing nations would not be threatened by the TRIPS agreement
because they could control the process of reform within their respective
sovereign borders. As a concession to developing nations. the U.S. made
sure to include provisions within TRIPS that granted developing nations a
longer time schedule in which to institute reform. By giving up some
sovereignty to the TRIPS regime. individual states would be guaranteed a
hand in the reform process required by the new international standards. As
more and more states stnrt to accede to TRIPS. the new standard of
intellectual property right protection will become firmly "embedded" as a
controll ing i nternat io nal norm.

POST·HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY (PUST)
I) As hegemonic conditions deteriorate. the prospects for regime
formation and maintenance diminish as well, although
cooperation is still feasible. In addition. as hegemonic Slability
declines, pre-existing international regimes may well continue to
nourish. Certain conditions must be in place in order for
cooperation to occur in spite of a deteriorating hegemonic order.
The presence of shared interests is an obvious criterion for the
promotion of cooperative agreements. A second, less obvious
condition that may foster participation in an international regime
is the existence of conflict.
2) A combination of related events and actions can build to
establish certain predictable relationships that facilitate
cooperation. In this conception of the process through which
cooperation is achieved, coercive means and the exploitation of
discord among nations can also be an equally important factor
explaining why cooperation occurs. As control by a dominant
state decreases, the potential for disagreement and conflict
increases. Conflict is often an essential impetus for cooperation.
3) Harmony results from one nation's policies. enacted in pursuit of
self-interest, helping to inadvertently fulfill another country's
goals. No adjustments need 10 be made by either country as a
result of the actions of the other. Harmony can occur without
communication of the exertion of influence. Cooperation is
accomplished by altering established patterns of behavior.
4) International change may spring from both positive and negative
inducements. Cooperation should be viewed as a reaction to
perceptions of actual or potential conflict.
5) The pursuit of self-interest leads to regime formation.
Cooperation is difficult, but achievable. Regimes are established
and subsequently shaped by their most powerful members, often
through coercion and threat. Regimes can have an effect on state
behavior by changing values and expectations.

Implications for TRIPS
According to realism, the U.S. worked 10 eslablish the TRIPS regime in
order to reverse or al leasl arrest the general trend of declining American
dominance relative 10 its economic competitors in high tech indUSlJial
sectors. According to PHST, the U.S., in pursuing its own national interest
created an international regime in order to further promote those interests.
The prospect of fUlure Irade conflict over intellectual property rights,
coupled with declining relative economic power, compelled the U.S. to take
a hard-I ine approach vis a vis other nations in order 10 coerce. Ihreaten, and
punish recalcitrant nations into acceding to TRIPS standards. Both realism
and PHST agree that TRIPS is a manifestalion of American self·interest
designed to afford the U.S. a short-term comparative advantage in high-tech
goods and services.
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